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*Islamophobia and the Time and Space of the Muslim Other*¹

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This paper is an attempt to shed light on how the “Muslim world” became packaged as temporally and spatially distant from the “modern world.” What astounds many world-system scholars is how the “Muslim *umma*,” like other major high civilizations of the global south who were once part of the core of the ancient world system—with the Muslim world at its center—found itself, by the late nineteenth century, at the losing end of a new global system, swallowed up whole and relegated to the margins of a Western-centric world with the “Muslim world” generally, and the Ottoman Empire more specifically, now residing at the losing end of this system, subordinated to European and, later, American power whereas previously it stood far ahead. The lens through which all actors of this new world-order came to understand their world was becoming ever more *racially* tainted, leading to a world where religion, language, ethnicity, and nation were reinterpreted in light of this new hierarchy and producing the belief that one group or another possesses some unique trait that legitimates its superior or unique characteristics above the rest. In the judgment of the new masters of the globe, Muslims fell quickly to the bottom and were designated as racially and culturally inferior to the West.

As a result of this new political and economic reality, the incorporation of the Middle East into the capitalist world-system had major racial implications that informed the ideological lens through which the intellectuals in the West and elsewhere understood and analyzed “Islam.” They produced a worldview that we can characterize as part of an Islamophobic discourse in which the “Islamic world” is understood to be spatially and temporally *distantiated* from the “modern West.” This paper takes us on a journey from Orlando Florida to the writings of European and American intellectuals to locate the central tenants of the colonizer’s discourse towards the Muslim world.

I. THE COLONIZER’S ISLAMOPHOBIC TEMPORAL TEMPLATE

For some two centuries now, many of us have imagined global diversity ranging along a historically hierarchical trajectory, as though it were a sloped, ever-ascending mass movement of humanity where cultures existing side-by-side at the same moment could be located at different points of time. By simply cruising the world, we could see not only

humanity's great cultural diversity but its historical as well. It is as though H.G. Wells had really invented his time machine allowing us, as we travel across the world's different cultural landscapes, to visit places of far-away time. Americans can cross their southern border and visit their "distant neighbor" as one book title advertizes. Or we could visit, as a promotional travel brochure claims, Morocco and encounter, on camel back, "ancient ruins" and an "age-old culture" where "life is much as it was centuries ago." We could, at this very moment, for instance, stand in Manhattan, look towards Iran, and declare, with the slightest hint of irony at such a claim, that because it is ruled by Mullahs it is "still feudal" and "stuck" in the fourteenth-century. We do, of course, realize that Mexico, Morocco, and Iran are all here in our very presence. But because of the dominance of a linear temporal perspective, which categorizes "societies" as containing their own space and time, this time-like travel myth has now continued for several centuries, and we have now become accustomed to see cultures or civilizations as possessing their own launching pads with some unable to even ignite their engines while others are deep into the way yonder. In this sense, our minds have been colonized by a nineteenth-century, if not earlier, dogma that prescribes a linear historical progress through which all "societies," although at radically different speeds and at varying points, have traveled. Some may "still" be at a "traditional" or agricultural/rural phase while others are "nearer" to modernity, living in Middle age or feudal-like societies, but as soon as "they" get their true renaissance or religious and secular reformers—their equivalents of "our" philosophers and Luthers—they too can join the more "advanced" societies.

This temporal lens, with its peculiar epistemological ways of seeing the world of difference, was only slightly revised in the hands of the colonized, with much of it being accommodated by the political and intellectual elites—both secular and Islamists alike. While the colonizers constructed this historical imagination in their desire to dominate the global south so as to make it appear that their rule over the natives was a natural result of history's call for the realization of rationality, the Spirit, democracy, the liberation of women, or human rights, the colonized scrambled to re-narrate this very same discourse so as to place themselves as the vanguards for the emancipation of their societies. By removing the colonizers from their midst and replacing them with "indigenous" leaders who have the best interest of their people in mind, they will be well-positioned, so they claim, to deliver their societies—which they admit are "still" in the grips of a stagnant mentality—to this glorious future. As Ali Mirsepassi recently argued, the colonizer's gaze "defines contemporary conditions in the [colonized] in terms of abstracted conditions of European historical experience" where the colonized is positioned to embody "aspects of Europe's past (feudalism, etc.) . . . [with] the assumption that . . . Europe has experienced this path in advance of the non-Western world."² In order to make this cosmology of time work for the anticolonial elites, they had to

remanufacture this evolutionary and stagist schemata so as to make it feasible to claim that, in the hands of an enlightened elite, they can fix their launching equipment and employ a more powerful engine that will propel them through time at a greater speed.

Recently, roaming Epcot Center during a visit to Disney World in central Florida with my family, I was able to see the persistence of this colonizer's narration of cultural difference along this continuum of time. Here I could see how glaringly this triumphalistic vision of an evolutionary and stagist view of the globe has been put on display as an entertainment spectacle, a site not unlike any other major pilgrimage center where folks can come together and experience the rites of passage from traditional to modern society. It may be a coincidence that, in the year 2004, I visited Disney World's Epcot Center in Central Florida shortly after I had read about Chicago's World's Columbian Exhibition of 1893, but the timing could not have been better. Walking through Epcot Center, it seemed that I was in the grip of a plagiarized text that was written over 100 years earlier.

Epcot Center is organized by two central themes. On one side sits *Future World*, which, immediately upon entry, depicts a "highly developed" civilization, comprised of science, technology, and progress. This side of the park contains science exhibits and such rides as *Spaceship Earth* in which passengers travel through time "from the dawn of man to the future." Here, Europe and the U.S. represent the civilizational location in which science, philosophy, and secularism are assumed to have been invented and, over time, diffused off to far-away worlds.

The narrative suggests that only during the *Dark Ages* have other, particularly Islamic, civilizations lent a hand to the enterprise of human development. The narrator on the speaker pauses when the ride approaches the stage of Europe's Dark Ages in which Rome, because of the Gothic attacks, was burning and experiencing a moment of deep illness and immediately inserts the comment: "But not all was lost. The torch of light was secured by the Muslims of the East" which, he continued, held on to the torch *until* Europe was prepared to take it back once it had, with the coming of the Renaissance, recovered its health. Notice here that the manner in which Epcot's thematic structure incorporates the Other within its storyline of progress maintains the prevalent sense that Islamic civilization is marginal to the developmental trajectory, in essence acting only to *safeguard* "our" torch of progress, which appears to be detained in some sort of mid-life crisis during the *Dark Ages*. Once "we" have recuperated from this temporary illness, the Islamic Other simply hands the torch back to its rightful owner, *unchanged*, and the West continues upon its path of enlightenment and progress, developing its science, its printing, its philosophy, and its creative arts. Interesting also to note is that the passengers on this ride sit in a moving vehicle that consistently *climbs upward as they pass through time* until they reach the final point of

destination, where AT&T lights up the entire globe and all of man is united under a single beam of light.

Moreover, upon exiting *Spaceship Earth* and proceeding to the other sectors within this scientific and technological side of the park, one is in constant interaction with hi-tech gadgets and robotic machines. Even the cafes are called “Innoventions,” and the shops, immediately upon exiting futuristic rides, are filled with space creatures and battery and electronic-run toys and other paraphernalia. By contrast, on the other far-side of the park, where the *World’s Showcases* can be reached by crossing a bridge over a body of water, one may visit many “traditional folk cultures,” such as Morocco, Native Americans, and China. Here, the visitor is invited to explore other cultures within suggested representative spaces. Morocco, for example, is showcased in part inside of a Mosque, where one can shop and experience the Orient, meeting such figures as *Aladdin* and observing a sensuous belly dancer perform on stage to Arabic music. In this location, one will have a hard time finding hi-tech gadgets to interact with. Instead, the toys available in these shops are full of camels, fez hats, oriental rugs, belly dancing outfits, pyramids, multiple types of plastic swords, and Mummy games and mugs. Indeed, rather than interacting with computers and robots, when it comes to Morocco, one has the pleasure of interacting with the belly dancer. While it is true that more “advanced” societies like Norway, France, and the United States appear on this side as well, they are usually represented in both their youth and mature stages, such as the simple Norwegian village or in the shops of Paris, where one can find “modern” gadgets to buy, like the Eifel Tower. The Other civilizations are, in contrast, always represented as static, non-evolving entities.

Thus, Disney World, obsessively embodying themes of progress and the future, is an iconic representation of our racialized discourse regarding civilization and progress, providing a typical Eurocentric understanding of modern global history as entertainment. In a sense, it offers a popular version of the colonizer’s model of the world, deploying a clear distinction between the rational, scientific, enlightened, and “developed” nations of Western civilization and the undeveloped, particularistic, religious, sensuous, and emotional civilizations of Islam and all Others. This narrative implies, implicitly, that the global south sits far behind the West not because of a historical system organized on an unequal foundation but simply as a result of the distinctive and political qualities “we” in the West possess. In this sense, Disney-reality fits snugly into a political project that posits the West as superior to any other civilizational model of past and present.

The stark imitation of this Disney spectacle with the World’s Columbian Exhibition of 1893 is stunning. This Orientalist representation of the world is, as Edward Said has argued, not new. For Said, “In the system of knowledge about the Orient, the Orient is less a place than a *topos*, a set of references, a congeries of characteristics, that seems to have its origin in a quotation, or a fragment of a text, or a citation from someone’s work on the

Orient, or some bit of previous imagining, or an amalgam of all these."³ Orientalism is, after all, defined by its constant urge to plagiarize past texts.⁴ Long before the arrival of Disney World, the organizers of Chicago's World Fair, much like future Disney *Imagineers*, divided their exhibitions into two categories that look almost identical to Epcot. Here, the civilized white sector of the city's exhibition, with its commerce, advanced manufacturing, iron, and steel, displayed buildings of Manufacture, Art, Administrations, Machinery, and Electricity in contrast with the primitive villages of Samoans, Egyptians, Dahomans, Turks and others.⁵ Indeed, as in Epcot, there was a spatial and temporal divide between the civilized and primitive sector of the Exhibition, and in order to go from one to the other, one had to leave the white man's city and enter through another gate in order to reach the colored man's world.

Of particular notice is how, in the Columbian World's Fair as well as in Disney's Epcot Center, the industrial, modern, scientific-rational Self is distanced from the Other, both spatially and temporally. Although non-Western and Western civilizations exist on the planet simultaneously, they are constructed as living in different historical times and spaces. The Muslims, in the case of Epcot, live in the time of old Norwegian and German folk culture before the latter moved into modernity and evolved into a mature civilization. The Muslims, the Native Americans, and all Others are frozen in time while the West takes off into space. The Other thus is distanced from the West although it exists simultaneously with it. The implication is that Western civilization, in past epochs, once lived in a developmental stage similar to that of Other races and cultures, which are indeed seen as live examples of a prior Western Self that was still in its childhood. However, having evolved and matured into a highly developed human species, the West is understood to have progressed forward in time, *crossing the bridge* to the other, more scientific and mature, side.⁶ In short, this form of representation "has the explicit purpose of distancing those who are observed from the time of the observer, a denial of coeval time."⁷ As one *Chicago Tribune* reporter of the 1893 World's Fair put it in his reflection of the exhibitions: "What an opportunity was here afforded to the scientific mind to descend the spiral of evolution, tracing humanity in its highest phases down almost to its animalistic origins."⁸ Others were similarly showing exuberance for the opportunity to witness life as it had "been led by our faraway ancestors or predecessors in the earliest Stone Age."⁹ As Raymond Corbey suggests, "World fairs... were part of a... landscape of discourse and practice, providing a cultural technology for situating metropole and colony within a single analytic field, thus creating an imagined ecumene."¹⁰ The colonizer's template made the Other appear to belong to an earlier developmental stage along which it has a great distance to travel before it can reach a level which whites or Americans and Europeans inhabit. "Colonial others were incorporated narratively... They were assigned their roles in the stories told by museum exhibitions, world

fairs, and colonial postcards. They were cast as contemporary ancestors..."¹¹ This is also why today a writer from the United States visiting the Kalahari desert can describe her journey in the following manner:

*We found people who called themselves Ju/wasi and were living a lifestyle of our ancestors, a lifestyle of the African savannah that began before we were human beings, changing in form but not in essence as time passed . . . To me, the experience of visiting this place and these people was profoundly important, as if I had voyaged into the past through a time-machine. I feel that I saw the Old Way, the way of life that shaped us . . .*¹²

Notice that in Epcot and Columbia's World Fair, stretching a full century apart, both share the notion that "progress" has been made more acutely on one side of the world while those on the Other side remain static and frozen in time. The differences are, of course, important, where in the earlier World's Fair, under the influence of social Darwinism, the divide was literally a racial and biological one in which "organizers divided the World's Fair into two racially specific areas," with "the White City depict[ing] the millennial advancement of white civilization while the Midway Plaisance, in contrast, presented the undeveloped barbarism of uncivilized, dark races."¹³ This would change as a result of a "development" model that put in place an alternative version for understanding this evolution, where one's culture and his capacity to use science, tools and technology was now understood as the defining criteria upon which his advancement could be measured.¹⁴ Therefore, while Epcot offers some differences from its 1893 predecessor in details like a bridge that *connects* the World Showcase with the future and scientific oriented other side of the theme park as compared to the exiting gate of the 1893 World's fair that *divided* savage societies from that of civilized people, its temporal template ranking and locating societies on a linear scale of time is evident in both theme parks. That is, in the old version, as illustrated in the example of the 1893 World's Fair, the distance between the civilized White City and all its Others was a racial fact, due to a Darwinian inspired schemata, where the "advanced white races worked toward a perfect civilization,"¹⁵ while in the Epcot example, by contrast, what divided the two—and what needed a bridge rather than an exiting and re-entering gate—was the level of technology a culture was able to display to the world. Indeed, this change was made possible by the struggle of the colonized to rearticulate social Darwinism into a tool that they could use to acquire state power and place them as the new civilizers of their own people.

This is what I call the colonizer's temporal template, a way of seeing time and the Other that has a tremendous impact on the way the colonized, in their attempt to emancipate themselves from the colonizer, understand

social change and progress, leading them to think that the only way they can join modernity is through a massive cultural, political, and technological overhaul of their societies. The colonizer's time of the Other was strategically revised in a number of ways, yet remained loyal to it as well.

In part this essay is a study of the formation and growth of a profoundly influential fiction that many began to accept as true in the period since the flowering of global colonialism and social Darwinism that stretched from the nineteenth-century to our present period. As Johannes Fabian's analysis of modern Anthropology suggests, these two examples of the World Fair of 1893 and of our contemporary Epcot, stretching a full century apart, seemed to play a bigger role than simply an attempt by the colonizer to understand the Other's culture and instead constructed "its Other in terms of topoi implying distance, difference, and opposition," where "its intent was above all . . . to construct ordered Space and Time—a cosmos—for Western society to inhabit."¹⁶

This temporal distantiating of Western civilization from the Other made it tolerable, even necessary, *to live* and inhabit a world of extreme political and economic inequality. Indeed, the ranking of the globe's diverse populations, especially after the social Darwinist Herbert Spencer published his double treatise of "Primitive Man—Emotional" and "Primitive Man—Intellectual" (1876), became so commonsensical that by the turn of the twentieth-century it seemed second nature to declare the "savage as a creature of retarded development: the savage had 'the mind of a child and the passions of a man'."¹⁷ The colonizer's racialized discourse, in essence, made it possible to juxtapose white men with black men, with the former seen as able to inherit a biological or cultural advantage from their past ancestors and thereby rationalizing why they, the West, hold the torch of light over all Other races and civilizations. This is precisely also why "Black men, in contrast, might struggle as hard as they could to be truly [civilized], without success. They were primitives who could never achieve true civilized manliness because their racial ancestors had never evolved that capacity."¹⁸

The discursive roots of this colonizer's temporal template can be found in earlier centuries, but, by the nineteenth, it fully blossomed, and intellectuals and statesmen alike began to use it with the slightest of ease, acquiring a commonsensical way of seeing Self and Other. It allowed sophisticated philosophers like Hegel to pronounce that "China and India lie, as it were, still outside the World's history" and that "The Egyptians are vigorous *boys*, eager for self-comprehension, who require nothing but clear understanding of themselves in an ideal form, in order to become *Young Men*."¹⁹ For Hegel, such civilizations were retrograde, where the *Geist* had long deserted and moved West in its historical march to find true consciousness²⁰: "Europe is 'plainly' the goal of history ... The Orientals were the childhood of the world, the Greeks and Romans in its youth and

manhood, the Christian people are its maturity'."²¹ In the American context, it made possible for president Theodore Roosevelt his definition of Africa and other such "primitive" continents as "waste spaces" in need of a civilized race to set it on the straight path of evolution, spaces that Roosevelt defined as being "void of meaningful human activity" and in need of a people "ready to put them to good use."²² This temporal template also underlay the literary narrative of the *North American Review*, which "declare[d] with no lack of confidence that the majority of the inhabitants of the British West Indies 'are incapable of independent progress. They can advance only under the pressure of the vigorous influences of northern civilization; without this contract they degenerate and regress.'"²³

By the nineteenth century, terms like savage, primitive, traditional, underdeveloped, and medieval came to denote the Other "as a fossil of an earlier period"²⁴ who are understood to possess a "whole range of attributes" such as being superstitious and reactionary while the Europeans "represented themselves as rational, energetic, in control, progressive-minded, disciplined, punctual, and efficient."²⁵ What is important to note here is that by positing the Other as located in a distant past, this new way of framing history was able to provide an ontology that made it appear that the Other *is* distant from the modern self even though they both exist contemporaneous to each other. The colonizer's temporal template, possessing the power of a gifted magician, actually performs a stunt on the mind so as to distantiate the *contemporary* populations of the global south from their Western counterparts right in front of the viewer's eyes.

By temporalizing the world in this way, the imperial relationship between the colonized and the colonizer was rationalized on the ideological basis that the less evolved Other is not "mature" or "developed" enough for self-rule. As Jacobson sums up the ethos of this generation of American travelers and statesman, they are so drastically "behind" on the evolutionary scale that "we are not beholden to treat them as equals" and that we must instead civilize them "in this long process of helping them along."²⁶

This temporal lens was an ingenious new social technology to rationalize the colonial encounter. As Chakrabarty has persuasively argued, "Within this thought, it could always be said with reason that some people were less modern than others, and that the former needed a period of preparation and waiting before they could be recognized as full participants in political modernity."²⁷ He defines this as "the waiting room version of history," where the colonized appears as lingering in an evolutionary or developmental stage of immaturity that with time, and a whole lot of proper rearing by a benevolent superior, will acquire enough maturity and wisdom to allow them to join other civilized and advanced peoples. Until then, since the colonized are not yet ready to be left on their own, they must "wait" until they prove to their superiors that they have matured enough. Indeed, what made possible this idea of a waiting room is a temporal

scheme of distancing the Other and denying her coevalness with more “advanced” civilizations.²⁸ That is, once the global south was ruled and administered by Western countries, there emerged alongside this new power reality a discourse that placed the Other as a form of property that, with the philosophical interventions of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, was looked upon as land lying unused awaiting a mature and able soul to make it productive.²⁹

The example provided by Chakrabarty is John Stuart Mill who, in his classic texts “On Liberty” and “On Representative Government,” claims that, in order for the Indians and Africans to be permitted the highest ideals of self-rule, “some historical time of development and civilization (colonial rule and education, to be precise) had to elapse before they could be considered prepared for such a task,” thereby assigning all “rude nations” a waiting period as they were far from “arriving” at the level appropriate for such privileges. In this temporal imagination, it was the colonizer alone who had the rights for self rule simply because some “people were to arrive earlier than others” (Mill cited in Chakrabarty 2008:8). Mill rationalized his argument on the grounds that Europeans had already reached the stage in which they “had ‘attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion’” while “he thought that India, China and ‘the whole East’ . . . had been ‘stationary for thousands of years.’”³⁰ Given the fact that “non-Europeans,” Mill continues, “were moral and political infants, and thus below the age of consent, a ‘parental despotism’ by a ‘superior people’ was perfectly ‘legitimate’ and in their own long-term interest” for it would “facilitate their transition to a ‘higher stage of development’.”³¹

Of course, this notion of a hierarchy of civilizations, marked from low to high depending on the size of the skull, or the amount of technological gadgets, the number of books published, a country’s accumulated GNP, and so forth were all and still—with the exception of skull measurement—used to measure where one stood in this hierarchy. By using such standards for measuring the worth of the globe’s populations,³² it legitimized not only the increasing massive disparities of wealth between the colonizer and the colonized but also why the latter ought to determine whose political structure is civilized, whose human rights are to become the universal standards for the entire globe, and which civilizations or countries are “mature enough” to possess nuclear weapons. That is, by placing a temporal template that makes us see the world in terms of differentially and hierarchically located cultures, religions, and civilizations, it naturalizes the power relations between the core and periphery, making it appear that the West has more gadgets or a bigger GNP—or the privilege of acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the Others do not—because they are the adults and the Others are their children. Of course, if the child behaves obediently, you may spoil it a bit by giving her a bigger stipend or gadgets to play with, but to the unruly child, strict punishment must be maintained.

Indeed, this form of evolutionary cosmology relaxes the colonizer's mind so as to feel self-assured every time they have to beat the child into submission, if not with the carrot (food and medical boycotts) then through the stick (military occupation and heavy artillery bombardment).

II. THE DIALOGICAL METHOD AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ISLAMOPHOBIC METHODOLOGIES

Unfortunately, there is now a resurgence and a return to a nineteenth century way of understanding the time machine by Western intellectuals. While in the mid-twentieth century there emerged in the West, as we have seen, a revision of the old social Darwinist model to allow, at the persistence of the anticolonialist movements, for the possibility of the Other to cross over the bridge of time, there is now emerging, once again, the view that there may be something intrinsically dysfunctional about some civilizations that such crossing, due to the incompatibility of "their" (read Islam) religion to modernity, is not possible at all. Indeed, for many contemporary Western academic writers, such as Bernard Lewis (1990) and Samuel Huntington (1993), crossing over the bridge into modernity means that Islam itself may have to disappear. According to Bernard Lewis, the prophet of Islam and his religion, while having served Muslims well in the premodern world, through some measure of success, now blocks their development into a better, more civilized world of modernity. Moreover, such pundits interpret the rise of contemporary Islamist movements as the natural and essential expression of a religious and civilizational project that stems from some time-immemorial source. This source is characterized as predating modernity and containing a world-view that makes it literally impossible to join the modern civilized world.³³ According to these writers and others, the fact that prior modernization efforts failed in some Islamic regions proves that Islam cannot accommodate itself to the modern world. Indeed, the present conflict between "the West" and "Islam" is due largely to the fact that these are two antithetical civilizations, they claim. Islam represents a cultural universe that is in essence anti-modern and anti-Western. That is, Muslims, according to this narrative, are culturally indigestible to the modernist project. This is because they have learned from their seventh-century predecessors in Mecca and Medina traits and mentalities that are intrinsically anti-modernist.

The problem with this perspective is that it relies upon a method that posits "Islam" and the "Muslim world" as containing its own spatial and temporal unity. Islamists, like all of their nationalist predecessors in the Middle East, are engaging in a political project that is exclusively the act of a modern script. The religious symbolism that they use, the appropriation of Qur'anic text and the manner by which they select the Prophet Muhammad's *Hadiths* (sayings of the prophet collected over time) is made available to us as it is filtered through the temporal lens that the colonizer made possible over a hundred years ago. Hence, it is that template, in its

modern form, which the Islamists use to interpret key cultural and religious text. Indeed, what is ironic is that Orientalists, when interpreting “Islam,” confuse this modern lens as the actual lens of some time-immemorial culture in the same way that Islamists do.

Moreover, reading some of the West’s most influential thinkers today seems like a revised version of John Stuart Mill’s “waiting room of history,” where the United States, in its benevolent role as a democratizing agent in a “neighborhood” (read: Middle East) hostile to pluralism and tolerance, if it does its job competently in Iraq, may finally bring modernity to that part of our troubled and backward world by providing a role model for the other Arabs of the region who remain hopelessly in the grips of despotism. Thomas Friedman, a highly influential *New York Times* bestseller among middle class liberals in the United States, for instance, wrote multiple *New York Times* editorials during the first couple of years of the war on Iraq all the while being in support of the war and only slightly revising his position when American success looked bleak. He assures his readers that “U.S. power is not being used in Iraq for oil, or imperialism, or to shore up a corrupt status quo, as it was in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Arab world during the cold war.” Instead, falling back on earlier rhetoric of the White Man’s burden, the war represents, he asserts, “the most radical-liberal revolutionary war the U.S. has ever launched—a war of choice to install some democracy in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world.”³⁴ If it does fail, he warns his readers, the blame resides not only in the fact that the United States had too few numbers of troops but also in a time-immemorial “natural tribalism” that defines the Arab world.³⁵ The discourse of “the heart of the Arab-Muslim world,” “the Arab street,” or the “infertile soil of the Arab world” are utilized not unlike the way social Darwinists rationalized imperial rule during the hey days of imperialism: “In the Arab-Muslim world today the progress-resistant cultural forces seem to be just too strong, especially in Iraq, which is why it is so hard to establish durable democratic institutions in that soil.”³⁶ Indeed, the problem is that “Iraq was already pretty broken before we got there—broken, it seems, by 1,000 years of Arab-Muslim authoritarianism.”³⁷ If there are any fingers to be pointed at the United States, it is that the administration did not properly politically prepare the child for its new civilized way of administrating a democratic society: “Had we properly occupied the country, and begun political therapy,” he claims, “it is possible an American iron fist could have held Iraq together long enough to put it on a new course.”³⁸ Again, when reading Friedman, one cannot help but feel as if he is reading a plagiarized text taken from some nineteenth century philosopher with “the theme of Europe teaching the Orient the meaning of liberty” (Said 1979:172). In Thomas Friedman’s own words:

Iraq was always a struggle of hope against history. After 9/11, and the Arab Human Development Report detailing the

*increasingly dysfunctional Arab-Muslim world—which produces way too many terrorists—we had a real interest in collaborating with Iraqis to try to build one decent, progressive, democratizing society in the heart of the Arab East.*³⁹

In short, his analysis falls back on the pre-scripted Orientalist fantasy that the Arab world is just not mature enough to take up the opportunity that we, the more advanced civilizations of the West, have offered them. Their culture is too tribalistic and feudal, not yet ripe to take advantage of the fruits of civility and modernity. In that sense, Thomas Friedman, as is the case for Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, and the many others who now stock the shelves of our bookstores, share the same episteme of the folks that came before them in the classical period of imperialism in the nineteenth century.

The underlying idea behind this essay is that the textual and civilizational representations used by Islamists and religious authorities is a product of a global discursive exchange that is expressive of our very present and modern world, of the here and now. To represent the Islamists as “clinging” to a past “real” entity called Islam requires an Orientalist and colonizing lens that suppresses the dialogical—and very immediate—nature of the actual encounter. Indeed, the method that is contained in a Huntington-Lewis type of analysis takes us back once again to viewing the world in a manner very similar to the one contained in the 1893 Chicago’s World Fair where the Other civilizations and religions are once again forced to be locked in the child’s waiting room of history, but this time it is not their race that has to evolve before permitting them to leave their rooms but the complete eradication of their dysfunctional civilization. Otherwise, Samuel Huntington tells us, there is nothing else we can do but to accept the fact that “we” in the West have to bunker down and prepare for a persistent conflict between two antithetical civilizations, one modern and mature and civilized and the Other lost in time, an adolescent who is rebellious and in need of good parenting.

In the attempt to challenge these Orientalist representations of Islam, I am highly influenced by Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis and Edward Said’s notion of a “contrapuntal imagination.” Through the imaginative method of these two scholars, the researcher remains aware of the dialogical nature in which cultures are narrated and produced. What I find most productive about the methodologies these two provide is that they allow us to apply a new lens in which we can see the dialogical processes at work in which phenomena like “civilizations,” religions, and identities do not contain their own temporal and spatial bodies but are instead in constant motion with Others. The time and space of the Other is in fact the very same time and space that “We” inhabit. Thus what I find most appealing about a Wallersteinian and a Saidian approach is that we are able to finally clear our lens a bit and see, in fact, that a nation’s (or a religion’s, civilization’s . . .) temporality and spatiality has no isolated essence within a

globe composed of a multiple, yet limited, variety of civilizations, and that to reduce any one of them to a crude temporal or spatial island, each containing its own *Geist*, is to be fooled by those who have been peddling the time machine idea. Such a portrayal runs counter to the idea, as put forward by Wallerstein, Said, and others, that modernity, at the macro level, discursively structures those micro-civilizational differences. What appears as an essential expression of difference is in effect the product of power asymmetries, which form and constitute those differences.

For those who are entrapped within the temporal and spatial lens that the colonizer invented long ago, each nation, religion, or civilization appears to have its own ethos that is stable within its spatial boundaries and temporal origins. In this sense, the people of a specific group are understood as having a single will, one mind, one race, one Qur'an, one five-pillars, one masculinist culture, one "unreformed religion" waiting for a Luther or a Newton to bring them into the modern world. The method I am using here allows for an analysis that challenges this highly essentialized notion of difference by positing that all civilizations are the invention of one modernity that all of us, from different locations, are struggling to bend in multiple ways. Such an analysis suggests that actors in different locations of the modern world-system are constrained to act within multiple political containers, which elites mobilize to their advantage through the use of national, religious, and cultural discourses.

Given such strengths, one of the challenges we now ask of world-system scholars is to address the resurgence of colonialist and racist discourses that are emerging in our midst, especially in Europe, the United States, and Israel. Just as Wallerstein in the 1970s shattered the orthodox theorem that capitalism is reduced to the proletariat-bourgeoisie dichotomies by illustrating that non-wage labor, including such labor forms as slavery and second-serfdom, are all a product of the world-capitalist system, we also need to shatter present hegemonic discourses that suggest there are certain "cultural systems" which stand outside and even predate modernity. In previous decades, we challenged those who often accorded the industrial working class a leading "historical role" of revolution over other figures of labor (such as peasant labor and reproductive labor). We did so by demonstrating that different labor formations were an intrinsic functioning characteristic of capitalism, rather than being different modes of production belonging to different historical periods of mankind. Similarly, today we must forcefully challenge the belief that Islam stands as the symbol of premodern, feudal society.

As many of us have now recognized, Marxists are not immune from holding this essentialist discourse. The manner by which some Marxists have traditionally dealt with religious movements, especially of the Islamic variant, is congruent with the racist discourse found in Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington. The more orthodox variants of Marxist thought tend to see religious identity as "pre-capitalist," belonging to a primitive, fourteenth-

century feudal mentality that has not evolved and that is caught up with the modern mode of global capital production. Islam, then, is a preindustrial social structure frozen in time in which “most people still work in agriculture or in handicraft production.” Hence, the lack of a vibrant capitalist class and a vanguard proletariat which moves the system forward, both of which, according to some Marxists, are crucial for modernity, forms the explanation of “what went wrong” and why Islam has been unable to adapt itself to “modernity, industrialization, and representative democracy.”⁴⁰

This assertion strikes us as quite odd, for, as far as we know, mankind has not yet invented H.G. Wells’ time machine. The fact that the holders of this view can characterize and classify people as living in different historical times shows the alluring and racist power of this discourse. As Ali Mirsepassi has argued, Marxism does not really differ from liberal or conservative views of the global order in that, like its more conservative counterpart, it views history in a linear and evolutionary manner: “The scheme of historical gradation implied in this narrative forecloses the fullness of historical possibility by insisting on the adherence of human practice to an abstract, allegedly scientific, scheme of historical progress.”⁴¹ In the same way that Hegel conceptualized Africa as “a continent enclosed within itself...[where] history is in fact out of the question,” some Marxists, armed with this Orientalist view of history, at times supported nationalist policies which aimed to destroy what they perceived to be archaic institutions acting as obstacles to capitalist or postcapitalist modernity.

This is in fact where World-system and Saidian scholars can have much to say by showing that, within the constitution of the modern world, an “outside,” external, self-containing set of civilizational islands standing next to, but somehow spatially and temporally disconnected from the other more modern civilizations, can no longer be posited to exist. As Georg Simmel, a German sociologist, recognized during the time in which the colonizer’s spatial and temporal template was most prevalent: “The border is not a spatial fact with sociological effects, but a sociological fact which takes a spatial form.”⁴² Such a view allows the public, especially in the West, to take another look at their temporal categories and appreciate the fact that their constant discourse of distancing the Other is a myth that serves the purpose of fear and ridicule and is the greatest obstacle to the ideals that they posit as a central core of “Western” belief. The first step is for the writers and intellectuals, by commanding posts of privilege to the way the Other is constructed, to begin to unthink the temporal and spatial lens that they have acquired from the social Darwinists in the nineteenth century and to begin building a new house where all of its members can share the space equally.

III. THE TIME OF THE MUSLIM IN THE MODERN WESTERN (ISLAMOPHOBIC) IMAGINATION

In contrast to Orientalist historians like Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, other scholars have cautioned against the popular notion that “Islam” and the “West” have historically understood each other as two separate, and antithetical, civilizations. We have become so accustomed to talking about Europe and Islam as distinct civilizations that we forget that up to the early modern period, with the end of the Reformation in Europe, Islam was understood by the Christians of Medieval Europe not as its own world but as a *deviant* sect within the family of monotheists. In contrast to this view of civilizational clash, distinguished scholars like Albert Hourani, Maxine Rodinson, Samir Amin, and Hichem Djait, all of whom are leading figures in Middle Eastern and Islamic studies, have long cautioned against such generalizations, demonstrating that such a history is much too nuanced to be viewed in this modern temporal and spatial lens. Indeed, as Maxine Rodinson has pointed out, Muslims and Christians, up until early modernity, rather than viewing each other as two irreconcilable civilizations, instead perceived one another through the prism of conflicting sects whose origins come from the same original source:

*In the Middle Ages, Islam had been considered a schism, a kind of perversion of Christianity. This was, for example, how Dante regarded it. It was a time of an increasing number of schisms in the Church, expressed not only by religious differences but by political ambitions as well. This was the case with Islam, and indeed, it could now be seen as a mere schism, one of many.*⁴³

Christians residing in what would eventually be called Europe, rather than defining Islam as a civilization unconnected to Christendom, instead perceived it as a heretical innovation of Christianity. Islam was not, as it became after the Enlightenment, seen as completely outside of the Christian self, where a strict ontology of difference would produce an understanding that Islam possessed a time-space perimeter that was radically different than the time-space of Europe.

As Rodinson’s intervention above suggests, while Islam is perceived in the Christian Medieval conception as a deviant faith, it nonetheless remains inside the time-space of the self, for even a deviant, no matter how misdirected, is one who has access to the truth but has perverted it. In the words of Hichem Djait, “As excessive as these judgments may be, they arose from the possibility . . . of admitting Islam into the body of Christian truth. Christian apologists simply wished to show that Islam was in error according to the canons of the Church, to deny the Prophet’s claim to be a real prophet, and to prove that the word of God was the word of God. From this standpoint, therefore, Allah is God . . . but he did not speak to Muhammad.”⁴⁴ A good case in point is St. John of Damascus (675-749), who incorporates Islam as one of many *Christian* heresies, but with the

defects of denying some of Christianity's essential truths (Hourani 1991: 10). In this sense Islam invoked a common tradition for "they too worshiped God in their own way, even if in doing so they were totally in error."⁴⁵

In this pre-Enlightenment conception of civilizations, the modern temporal template of civilizations, in which each is perceived to have a distinct time-space module, was far from the minds of the elites. For those medieval Christians who resided in the European continent, Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, was an imposture, a fake prophet who peddled Christian ideas but distorted them to attain power. In this sense, he was like the Pope for the Protestants of the sixteenth-century, acquiring an unwarranted post of privilege by deceptively placing himself as the keeper of the keys of heaven. Indeed, in the words of Martin Luther, "the Pope and the Turk are 'the two arch-enemies of Christ and his Holy Church,' and if the Turk is the body of Anti-Christ, the Pope is the Head."⁴⁶ In Hichem Djait's words, Islam's "point of departure," for these Christians, "was a deep anger at the Prophet for having blocked humanity's evolution toward universal Christianity by his 'false prophecy'. . . . Muhammad was a false prophet, an imposter, and a hypocrite."⁴⁷ For our concern here, no matter how disparaging these remarks may be, they nonetheless placed the Muslim as one who had access to eternal truth but was deceived by a false prophet.

This would radically change in the post-Enlightenment period. Beginning in the late seventeenth century and becoming dogma by the late nineteenth, Islam would become more and more relegated as something quite separate from "Western civilization," a *homo islamicus*, a civilization sealed off in its own allotted time-space, endowed with its unique and essential nature.⁴⁸ As this new ontology of civilizational difference consolidated itself into a systematic worldview, the Islam-as-a-sect argument of Christianity gave way to a more rationalist, historicist, evolutionary, progressive, and secular philosophy. The East and Orient in general, and Islam in particular, came to be understood in secularized and laicized language. This was not a quick transition from one system of thought to the other. Indeed, as Hichem Djait has explained, throughout this transition there was an intermingling of the two perspectives, where "Orientalism used first Christianity and then secular humanism as a stick to beat Islam." But it would be through this transition that Europe and its intellectuals would finally converge on the idea of progress and "of a civilizing or liberating mission."⁴⁹ In this sense, rather than viewing a Christian religious worldview as being overtaken by a secular one, it is more accurate to describe it as a transition in which religious discourse was redeployed in a more secular framework, where "anyone who studied the Orient a secular vocabulary in keeping with these frameworks was required."⁵⁰

The discursive power of this change should not be underestimated, for it allowed Eurocentric theorists to assign Europe with an exemplary status relative to other civilizations, thereby locking Islam into a temporal cage to which Europeans marched out of and freed themselves from many centuries

past.⁵¹ Immanuel Wallerstein captures well the ideological utility this intellectual change offered the West:

*The core of the explanation that was developed was remarkably simple. Only European "civilization," which had its roots in the Greco-Roman world of Antiquity (and for some in the world of the Old Testament as well) could have produced "modernity"—a catchall term for a pastiche of customs, norms, and practices that flourished in the capitalist world-economy.... There must be, there must always have been, something in the non-European high civilizations that was incompatible with the human march toward modernity and true universalism. Unlike European civilization, which was asserted to be inherently progressive, the other high civilizations must have been somehow frozen in their trajectories, incapable therefore of transforming themselves into some version of modernity without the intrusion of outside (that is, European) forces.*⁵²

Such intellectual changes were already visible by 1697 with one of the pioneers of the Enlightenment, Peter Bayle (1647-1706), whose monumental *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (Historical and Critical Dictionary 1697) influenced French Encyclopedists like Diderot and other rationalist philosophers of the eighteenth century. Indeed, his *Dictionnaire*, whom many called the "arsenal of the Enlightenment," marks a turning point by which to evaluate the emergence of a new civilizational discourse.⁵³ But it was not until Orientalists in the nineteenth century—like Volney, Montesquieu, Hegel, and Renan—focused in on comparing Islam to Europe that we can say this discourse became the dominant way of understanding the "difference" between Islam and the West, for it was not until then that such differences were sharpened so as to indicate a kind of typology of social types which accused Islam of cultural deficiencies in its distorted path to modernity. It is in this intellectual context that the idea emerges that the "underdeveloped" nature of Islamic societies was due not simply to political and economic factors but to something much "deeper," and, in the words of our contemporary Orientalist Bernard Lewis, is the product of a "classical Islamic view."⁵⁴

Volney (1757-1820), whose multivolume encyclopedia *Description del Egypte* (1809-22) came out of the Napoleonic Expedition of Egypt, provides a clear illustration of this new temporal ideology. In his detailed description of the Egyptians, he denounces Islam by accusing it for its crudity and anti-scientism, "bearing the mark of the barbarism it grew out of."⁵⁵ In his *Travels in Egypt and Syria*, for instance, he uses a discourse that will become a staple of Orientalist thought towards Islam, a discourse that will have a great effect not only on European thinkers but Muslims like Kemal Ataturk and other Middle Easterners as well. Volney's description of

Islam, in this passage below, utilizes effectively the temporal script that will shape many intellectual and political thinkers to come:

So far from helping to remedy the abuses of government, the spirit of Islamism, one might say, is their original source. To be convinced of this, simply examine the book which is the repository of that spirit. . . . Anyone who reads the Koran will be forced to admit that it has no idea either of man's duties in society or of the formation of the body politic or the principles of the art of governance. . . . If amidst the babel of this perpetual delirium any grand design or coherent meaning ever breaks through, it speaks with the voice of an obstinate, impassioned fanaticism. . . . The inevitable consequence of all this is to set up the most absolute despotism in the person of the ruler through the blindest self-sacrifice on the part of his followers. And this indeed was Muhammad's goal. He wanted, not to enlighten but to reign. He sought, not disciples but subjects. Of all the men who have dared to give laws to nations none, assuredly, was ever more ignorant than Muhammad. Of all the absurd creations of the human mind none is more wretched than his book. . . . It would be easy to prove that the troubles of the State and the ignorance of the people in that part of the world are more or less directly traceable to the Koran and its morality.⁵⁶

Following the example of Volney, the French Philosopher Voltaire would write a play with the title *Fanatism, or Muhammad the Prophet* depicting Muhammad as a theocratic tyrant, "who uses the sentiments and beliefs of human beings in order to serve his 'affreux desseins.'"⁵⁷ Likewise, for the great German philosopher, Hegel, Islamic civilization was of use only in so far that it had the historic task "to hand on Greco-Roman civilization to modern Europe," where "the Spirit had moved from Islam to modern Europe, whose historical mission was to absorb the antithesis into a synthesis, and nothing was left in the Muslim world except sensual enjoyment and oriental repose."⁵⁸ Interesting enough, in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, while Hegel praises Islam as serving an important function in the East by introducing the abstract One into that part of the world, thereby "transcending the negativity of the Oriental mind," he still ends up finding it lacking in that, unlike the concrete manifestation of the Spirit in Europe, its version of universalism was too abstract, causing the Spirit to lose its energy and thereby vanishing Islam "from the stage of history."⁵⁹

As we can see here, Islam was no longer viewed in the Medieval sense of a monotheistic sect led by a false prophet but as a civilization in and of itself that had played a role in the evolution of man but that, somehow, due to its internal makeup, ceased to evolve. For Ernest Renan

(1832-92), this was expressed as a natural course of development, where “different peoples have different abilities to move along this path. . . . There is a hierarchy of peoples, languages and cultures. . . . The Semitic spirit and Islam have conquered the world, but it can produce nothing else.”⁶⁰ In his now very famous lecture of 1883 that he delivered at the Sorbonne entitled “Islam and Science,” he came to the conclusion that “Islam was the characteristic product of the Semitic mentality. It was a religion which prevented the use of reason and growth of science. . . . There had never been, there could not be, such a thing as a Muslim scientist: science had indeed existed and been tolerated inside Islamic society, but the scientists and philosophers were not really Muslims.”⁶¹ So that, even when there were individuals within the Islamic world who have passed on a philosophical legacy, like Avicenna, they were not, in Renan’s mind, really Muslims or Arabs, for science came to them only as the “fossilized remnants of the ancient Hellenic world.” This denial is in keeping with Renan’s view of the development of mankind, where Muslim philosophy is considered to be an oxymoron for which *falsafa* (Arab philosophy) evolved from an outside, non-Islamic, source. In Renan’s own words, “the Muslim is in the profoundest contempt of education, science, [and] *everything that constitutes the European spirit.*”⁶² All one has to do to see this truth at work, says Renan, is visit the East or Africa where he will be “struck by the hidebound spirit of the true believer, by this kind of iron circle which surrounds his head, rendering him absolutely closed to science, incapable of learning anything or of opening himself to a new idea.”⁶³ The contempt he has for Islam, and the Semitic race in which it arose from, is spelled out explicitly:

*One sees that in all things the Semitic race appears to us to be an incomplete race, by virtue of its simplicity. This race—if I dare use the analogy—is to the Indo-European family what a pencil sketch is to painting; it lacks that variety, that amplitude, that abundance of life which is the condition of perfectibility. Like those individuals who possess so little fecundity that, after a gracious childhood, they attain only the most mediocre virility, the Semitic nations experienced their fullest flowering in their first age and have never been able to achieve true maturity.*⁶⁴

In keeping with this new temporal discourse, Renan’s denunciation of Islam is tied to a “stage in human development through which Europe itself has passed . . . and from which it has won deliverance.”⁶⁵

As we can see here, the nineteenth century represents a period in which the idea of Development, Progress, Evolution, Social forces, and other similar historicist terms were becoming the reigning ideas to explain civilizational, cultural, and religious differences. Dissimilarity between societies and civilizations were now viewed through the lens of a historicist

narrative with its views that all which exists rests on some historical manmade force, which is self-evolving, continuous, and changes in accordance to particular meetings of social and cultural forces that are altered by the internal dynamics of its constituent parts. Hence, each civilization, whether it is a religious or cultural force or the act of spirit, classes, status groups, or racial characteristics, contains within itself a developmental seed that rises in accordance to its particular type. In Albert Hourani's fine précis of this intellectual change, "history as such assumed a new importance: it was the working out of the nature and destiny of the universe, and the study of history was the attempt to define the laws by which the working out took place."⁶⁶

Thus Islam itself became a phase in the historical development of civilizations, one of many in the world each having its own essential time and space. This new system of thought can be characterized as a Toynbee-like-archive list of civilizations, each of which can be narrated, by a gifted historian or social scientist equipped with the proper conceptual tools, from its origins on, as though one were describing a biological organism from its simplest one cell structure to a more complex multi-cell unit. Where and at what point of development each and every unit is to be classified is a decision that needs to be made by a competent individual who has mastered the skills to evaluate the temporal point or historical stage it now resides in.

This point of view affected both intellectuals and statesmen alike, as is the classic examples of the sociologist Max Weber and the British Prime Minister Lord Cromer. In the case of Cromer, whose book *Modern Egypt* would gather together many facets of this new historical narrative into a simple system any literate person can comprehend (and one which will remain with us from his time to our very own, as the case with Thomas Friedman, Nail Ferguson and others today suggests), the occupation of Egypt, he argues, is being used by the British out of an act of kindness towards the less developed Egyptian and Islamic peoples of the Middle East. Cromer's reasoning for this is quite clear: Islam, even though it is a "noble monotheism," is a failure as a social system. The list that he provides of why it is a failure would become the script through which many after him would plagiarize in their attempt to rationalize either the hostile bombardment of that part of the world (as in the case today with the U.S. bombing of Iraq) or "indigenous" Muslim elites charged with "developing" their society (as we will see with the case of Kemal Ataturk below): As a religion Islam is patriarchal and oppresses its women; it does not separate mosque and state; it is intolerant to minorities and other faiths; it permits slavery and forced bondage, and, straight from Renan and Volney before him, it discourages science and Reason. As such, it is no surprise that he holds the belief that "Muslims can scarcely hope to rule themselves or reform their societies."⁶⁷

In more academic circles like that of Max Weber, the perception was that, if development, rationality, science, and capitalism developed in

Europe first and not elsewhere, then part of the explanation for its success may lie in Christianity itself, especially its Protestant variant, leading Weber to a massive historical comparative analysis of many world religions with that of Christianity, including Islam. To no surprise, he found the answer he was looking for: Islam, since it resembles the “pure type” of what he calls a “prophetic book-religion” like the Jewish and Christian tradition, but, unlike the latter two, Islam’s “ethic is ‘feudal,’ oriented—even in its mystical form—towards ‘world conquest’ and not towards ‘world renunciation’ as in Christianity.” Because of this difference in its ethics and ascetic orientation towards the world, he concludes that it must be internal features in Islam that caused it to fail in developing the type of formal rationality it needed to produce modernity. Those reasons are “the obviously unquestioned acceptance of slavery, serfdom, and polygamy; the disesteem for and subjugation of women; the essentially ritualistic character of religious obligations; and finally, the great simplicity of the modest ethical requirements.”⁶⁸ As such, the combined effects of its particular “feudal” nature mixed with a particular form of rationality not congruent with modernity, Islam—as a world religion—does not have the proper characteristics to develop a modern society like that found in the West.

In conclusion, we can say that the emerging expansion of colonization throughout the world by the rising power of Western states, gave this historicist temporal lens an intellectual vibrancy to explain the new global hierarchies of the modern world-system. It filled a void leftover by this European expansionary thrust into the global south and helped to explain why one sector of the world ruled and produced more wealth, machinery, finished goods, bigger bridges, steamships, and militaries than any other sector of the world. In the case of the “Muslim world” and, in particular, the Ottoman Empire, the fact that there was outright colonization from the Napoleonic period on, especially with the occupation in 1881 of both Tunisia and Egypt, added a deep sense that something about that part of the world had led to its decline and subordination to Western powers. Thus emerged the idea that Islam, like other “traditional” religious or cultural systems, must contain some type of barrier that does not permit it to progress along the same lines that the West has traveled. It is as though there is a genetic defect that has dwarfed Islam’s development into a mature, fully functioning specimen. This is indeed the central precept of Islamophobia, a view which understands the problems of our globe as stemming from a cultural defect in “their civilization” and the failure to see the possibilities that the problems that challenge us today are just as much “over here” as they are “over there.”

ENDNOTES

- ¹ This essay comes from a number of sections in Khaldoun Samman, *The Clash of Modernities: The Islamist Challenge and the Making and Unmaking of the "New" Jew, Turk, and Arab*, Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Press (Forthcoming June 2009).
- ² Ali Mirsepassi (2000), *Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran*, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, p. 8.
- ³ Said, Edward (1979), *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books, p.177.
- ⁴ see Timothy Mitchell (2002: 123-52), *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*, Berkeley, California: The University of California Press.
- ⁵ Gail Bederman (1996: 31, 35), *Manliness and Civilization: The Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- ⁶ This analysis is borrowed from Joseph Massad's (2001: 77-78) adaptation in his study of Jordanian nationalism from Johannes Fabian's analysis of anthropology (2002); Joseph Massad (2001), *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*, New York, New York: Columbia University Press; Johannes Fabian (2002), *Time and the Other*, New York, New York: Columbia University Press.
- ⁷ Massad (2001: 78).
- ⁸ quoted in Mathew Jacobson (2000:142), *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples At Home and Abroad, 1876-1917*, New York: Hill & Wang..
- ⁹ quoted in Jacobson (2000:116).
- ¹⁰ Raymond Corbey (1995:60), "Ethnographic Showcases, 1870-1930," in Jan Nerveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh (eds.), *The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Power*, London and New Jersey: Zed Books.
- ¹¹ Corbey (1995:72).
- ¹² emphasis added, Elizabeth Marshall Thomas (2006:6), *The Old Way: A Story of the First People*, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.
- ¹³ Bederman (1996:31).
- ¹⁴ Michael Adas (1989), *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press; David C. Engerman et. al., (2003), *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Cold War*, Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press..
- ¹⁵ Bederman (1996: 31).
- ¹⁶ Fabian (2002:111-12).
- ¹⁷ Herbert Spencer cited in Jacobson (2000:142).
- ¹⁸ Bederman (1996:29).
- ¹⁹ Hegel cited in Mirsepassi (2000:31).
- ²⁰ Paul Mendes-Flohr (1991: 81), *Divided Passions: Jewish Intellectuals and the Experience of Modernity*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- ²¹ Hegel cited in Mindes-Flohr (1991: 81).
- ²² Jacobson (2000:113).
- ²³ Jacobson (2000:119).
- ²⁴ Jacobson (2000:142)
- ²⁵ Adas (2003:27).
- ²⁶ Jacobson (2000: 50).
- ²⁷ Dipesh Chakrabarty (2008:9), *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- ²⁸ Fabian (2002).
- ²⁹ Parekh (1995).
- ³⁰ Parekh (1995:93).
- ³¹ Pieterse and Parekh (1995:93-94)
- ³² Adas (1989).

³³ Bernard Lewis's answer to the question "Why do they hate us?" is posited in terms of the "Islamic mind," located deep in doctrinal ideas, and represents a "return" to "the classical Islamic view" in which "the duty of God's soldiers is to dispatch God's enemies as quickly as possible to the place where God will chastise them—that is to say, the afterlife" (Lewis cited in Ali Mirsepassi, 2000). As Ali Mirsepassi argues (2000: 44), "the venturing of the 'clash of civilization' thesis depends upon the assertion that the hatred felt by Muslims has relatively little to do with any violation on the part of the West, and a great deal more to do with an ancient and almost supernatural form of enmity." Edward Said's (2000) now classic response to Lewis and Huntington is also recommended.

³⁴ Thomas Friedman, *New York Times*, October 30, 2003 "It's No Vietnam."

³⁵ Thomas Friedman, *The New York Times*, November 8, 2006, "Tolerable or Awful: The Roads Left in Iraq."

³⁶ Thomas Friedman, *The New York Times* November 29, 2006 "Ten Months or Ten Years."

³⁷ *ibid*

³⁸ *ibid*

³⁹ (Thomas Friedman, *The New York Times*, November 8, 2006, "Tolerable or Awful: The Roads Left in Iraq.")

⁴⁰ Lauren Langman and Douglas Morris, "The Roots of Terror," in Michael J. Thompson (2003), *Islam and the West: Critical Perspectives on Modernity*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: United Kingdom, 49–74. The schizophrenic mode of analysis of Langman and Morris's essay brings up many Orientalist assumptions ripe for a world-system's critique. Langman and Morris are struggling to devise a radical revision for the roots of terrorism and the rise of Islamic movements, including by mentioning the need for a "larger social-historical context" and the rise and fall of global hegemonies. But in the end, the entire edifice of their argument is directly taking from Bernard Lewis's book, *Islam and the West*, including this quote with which they are in full agreement: "The highly advanced Islamic pursuits of science, medicine, and philosophy ceased to develop [after the collapse of the Almohad Empire]. 'Independent inquiry virtually came to an end, and science was for the most part reduced to a veneration of a corpus of approved knowledge'" (p.61). They continue down this path by arguing that "Asian 'tigers' have prospered, as has Israel – while Islamic countries have remained poor, backward, and stagnant," leaving us with the intentional impression that it has something to do with the cultural ethic of Islamic culture. The "left" here meets Bernard Lewis in its crudest form. It reminds us very much of the argument levelled against African Americans: "Jews, Koreans, and Chinese made it, so what's wrong with you? Is it the dysfunctional, matriarchical family system now run by single parent families?"

⁴¹ Mirsepassi (2000: 40).

⁴² Georg Simmel quoted in Michel Warschawski, *On the Border*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: South End Press (2005:xvi).

⁴³ Maxine Rodinson (1987: 35), *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.

⁴⁴ Hichem Djait (1985: 13), *Europe and Islam: Cultures and Modernity*, Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

⁴⁵ Rodinson (1987: 26).

⁴⁶ Albert Hourani (1980: 10), *Europe and the Middle East*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁴⁷ Djait (1985: 12-13).

⁴⁸ Rodinson (1987: 60-61).

⁴⁹ Djait (1985: 19).

⁵⁰ Said (1979: 12-21).

⁵¹ Djait (1985: 51).

- ⁵² Immanuel Wallerstein (2006:33), *European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power*, New York and London: The New Press.
- ⁵³ Ibrahim Kalin (2004: 154-55), "The Roots of Misconception: Euro-American Perceptions of Islam Before and After September 11," in Joseph Lumbard (ed.), *Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition*, Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom inc., pp.143-187.
- ⁵⁴ see Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly* 266 (September 1990, p.49).
- ⁵⁵ Djait (1985: 24).
- ⁵⁶ Volney cited in Djait (1985: 25), emphasis added.
- ⁵⁷ Hourani (1980: 11).
- ⁵⁸ Hourani (1980: 13, 57).
- ⁵⁹ Hourani (1991: 26-27).
- ⁶⁰ Hourani (1991: 29).
- ⁶¹ Hourani (1980: 61); Massad (2007: 12-13), *Desiring Arabs*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- ⁶² Renan cited in Kalin (2004: 171), emphasis added by Kalin.
- ⁶³ Renan cited in Hourani (2004: 11-12).
- ⁶⁴ Renan cited in Said (1979: 149).
- ⁶⁵ Djait (1985: 51).
- ⁶⁶ Hourani (1980: 55).
- ⁶⁷ Hourani (1980: 12-13).
- ⁶⁸ Max Weber cited in Hourani (1980: 70).