

theories and
methodologies

Holy War Redux: The Crusades, Futures of the Past, and Strategic Logic in the “Clash” of Religions

GERALDINE HENG

GERALDINE HENG, Perceval Associate Professor of English, Women's Studies, and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas, Austin, is the author of *Empire of Magic: Medieval Romance and the Politics of Cultural Fantasy* (Columbia UP, 2003), as well as publications on postcolonial Singapore and Southeast Asian feminisms. She is completing “Race and the Middle Ages,” a book project for the Medieval Academy of America and the University of Toronto Press. Founder and codirector, with Susan Noakes, of the Global Middle Ages Project (G-MAP), she has begun a book to be called *Global England: A Literary Archeology of the Global Middle Ages*. With Lynn Ramey, she is coediting a special issue of the digital journal *Literature Compass* on the global Middle Ages.

[G]reat devastation [was] inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance. . . .

—World Islamic Front

[T]here is a Zionist Crusader war on Islam. . . . I call on mujahedin and their supporters . . . to prepare for long war against the Crusader plunderers. . . .

—Osama Bin Laden, “Bin Laden”

This war is fundamentally religious. . . . the most ferocious, serious, and violent Crusade campaign against Islam ever since the message was revealed to Muhammad. . . .

—Osama Bin Laden, “West”

[T]his Crusade, this war on terrorism, is gonna take a while.

—George W. Bush

This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the . . . reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.

—Bernard Lewis, “Roots”

IN A LEAD 1990 ARTICLE FOR THE *ATLANTIC MONTHLY*, BERNARD LEWIS, A WELL-KNOWN HISTORIAN OF ISLAMIC STUDIES, CONJURED THE CATCHphrase “clash of civilizations” to narrate what he saw as fundamental relations of enmity between Islamic societies and the countries of “the West”—“the West” being shorthand for polities that bear the legacies of Christendom, the Crusades, and the European Enlightenment—since the seventh-century emergence of Islam. Three years later, Samuel Huntington, a well-known political scientist, picked up Lewis’s theme and, in an article for *Foreign Affairs*, embroidered it into a theory of global relations to fill what Huntington saw as the political vacuum that had materialized after the cold war’s closure (“Clash”). (In 1945–90, the rhetoric of civilizational clash seemed to have been

adequately, if temporarily, filled by super-power contests between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies/surrogates.)

Huntington's theory spans more of the planet than Lewis's and pits "the West" against "the rest" (7) but singles out Islamic societies for special attention, because "Islam has bloody borders" (6). Shortly after his *Foreign Affairs* article, Huntington produced *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996); he also continued to produce students, some of whom graduated to become influential figures in media and government. After the violence of 11 September 2001, Lewis wrote a 2002 *New York Times* bestseller, *What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*, rehashing his *Atlantic Monthly* views—and served as adviser to the Bush administration, successfully urging the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

In the Western academy, the views of Lewis, Lewis-Huntington, and Huntington have been repudiated as dangerously reductive and simplistic, falsifying both history and contemporary politics. Minutely dissected, fiercely critiqued, and dismissed by cultural theorists, they have also been debunked by social scientists conducting quantitative data analysis of post-cold-war conflict.¹ In the media, national politics, and other public discourse, however, the views continue to lurk as an anxious substratum, breaking to the surface from time to time in suspicions raised, fears voiced, and sporadic hysteria, like the 2010 protests against mosque-building projects in Tennessee, Wisconsin, and California and against the Islamic center some two blocks away from Ground Zero in Manhattan (Goodstein).

For those of us who teach and study the literatures, cultures, and societies that make up the contact zones and time horizons mined by Lewis, there is deep irony in how handily his postulate of a clash of civilizations or religions, with its gift of axiomatic thinking, nimbly and ably serves the interests

of militant ideologies in the West and also of militant Islam. Civilizational incommensurability is congenial to the goals and global perspective of avowed enemies—the Newt Gingrichs and Rush Limbaughs of the world and also jihadist practitioners and theorists.

But this is not the only example of how academic thinking, historicism, and cultural theory can be conducive to politics espoused by renegade constituencies today. More troubling to those of us who have no difficulty dismissing the mentalities of Lewis-Huntington is how our own theories—hard-won, advanced with difficulty and determination for decades, and, we like to think, intrinsically progressive—intersect with logics entirely congruent with the beliefs of the Western political right and jihadi and Salafi ideologues. Most striking of all is how these constituencies, in retrieving the past for the politics of the present and future, assume a paradigm of temporality and historiography that we in the academy have advocated. A senior intelligence official quoted by *Newsweek* in 2003 sums it up: "These people have a different sense of time. . . . They hark back to the Crusades. For them, the jihad is never-ending" ("Al Qaeda's Summer Plans").²

Jihadists, if I may paraphrase, understand contemporary time to be multiple, interleaving within it earlier temporalities, so that the past inhabits and is coextant with the present, is experienced as contemporaneous, and estranges the present from itself in ways that academics have also intuited, theorized, and embraced. Modernity's multiplicity—its bearing within itself earlier times, enfolded temporalities—is also a cornerstone in Lewis's understanding of how "a new era of religious wars" erupts within modern time, because medieval time has not ended ("the struggle between these rival systems has now lasted for some fourteen centuries" ["Roots" 3]) but continues as an internal cleavage within modernity, making modernity noncoincident with itself.

Those who invoke the Crusades—from President George W. Bush, post-9/11, to the five signatories of the pre-9/11 World Islamic Front statement representing extreme Islamist groups in Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, as well as al-Qaeda—also see “religious war” as an expression of the consonance, the de facto simultaneity, of multiple times and the temporal plurality of the present. These constituencies use a naturalized and polemical language, of course, in their declarations, rather than the vocabulary of the academy, but the structure of their logic and the animating paradigm of their temporality interlock with ours. This is of no particular concern to them, but is dismaying to us, because it is yet another example of how our work can be made to assume other burdens than what we had designed.

The twenty-first century seems to be when theory’s chickens come home to roost in political coops not of our making. Throwing up his hands at how right-wing forces have made the lack of scientific certainty key to undermining warnings of global warming and to disengaging the necessity of timely action, Bruno Latour laments, after the fact, “[W]hat were we really after?” The doyen of *Science in Action* eyeballs theory’s success dourly:

[E]ntire Ph.D. programs . . . make sure that good American[s know] . . . that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a particular standpoint, and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same argument . . . to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives. (“Why” 227)³

Theoretical investments, moreover, are unevenly staked in the academy. While some have wrung their hands over theory’s exhaustion or indeterminate future, one neighborhood of “us” in the last two decades has been answering Latour’s Freud-like question “[W]hat were we really after?” with a chorus of voices that,

arriving at the same conclusion from a variety of interests, agree that above all the model of temporality pervasively cloned in the academy (it feels like forever) must end. Medievalists want theory to undo the academy’s entrenched understanding that historical time splits neatly into bifurcated, polarized periods, premodernity and modernity, with all the attention falling on the side of modern time.⁴

Demonstrating the many ways the medieval has been multiplied in, rather than evacuated from, modernity and postmodernity, those whose purview is “deep time” (Dimock 7) have worked to erode a simple algorithm of temporal oppositionality by demonstrating the coevalness of present and past, in the sedimented pluralities of the present.⁵ Theory has been a way to show that, yes, the Middle Ages were critically important and that *medieval* is not merely an arbitrary name devised to emplace a temporal interval in the West but more like the name of a repeating transhistorical pressure whose phenomenality renders later temporalities nonidentical with themselves in ways that facilitate a multiplicity of (political and other) uses.

It’s probably too early to declare the academic cloning of old axioms of oppositional time over, but the stakes for premodernists who must live in overlapping worlds are as great as for Latour: a politics of temporality for which we have called turns out to engage beautifully with the politics of temporality owned by constituencies we disavow. Yet Latour’s puckish willingness to engage with thorny issues—in this he resembles Gayatri Spivak and Dipesh Chakrabarty—also offers a way to face down demons: as, for example, when he considers anew the claims of a strategic empiricism today in the light of what he calls a new realist attitude: “The question was never to get *away* from facts but *closer* to them, not fighting empiricism but, on the contrary, renewing empiricism” (“Why” 232).

What might a strategically renewed empiricism deliver for rethinking current poli-

tics of temporality? Analyzing speech acts of pseudo-historicist naming by militant Islamists and the Western right may ground a small opportunity to consider the traction offered by a second moment of engagement with empiricism. In undoing the modern-premodern divide, militant Islamists do not claim that nothing new has occurred, that we have never been modern.⁶ Indeed, for muja-hedin the instantaneity of past and present often lodges in a hyphenated term, the Möbius strip of *Crusader-Zionist*, in which something new—the post-World War II creation of Israel—folds seamlessly into intimate convergence with nine-hundred-year-old medieval phenomena. Like the jihadists, Bernard Lewis (among others in the West) also invokes the seamlessness of Jewish and Christian traditions in a whole garment—“our Judeo-Christian heritage”—as a warrant for securing an us against a them.

Getting closer to facts, then, in a “second empiricism” in which “*matters of concern*” are the focus for those who teach and study an intercultural Middle Ages (Latour, “Why” 232, 231) might mean to point out that this fantasmatically friendly twin “Judeo-Christian” is a novel and contemporary, post-Shoah catachresis—one of the ways in which modernity in fact differs from premodernity—with the reminder, in precise detail, of how the long history of medieval European Christendom over four centuries is a history that witnessed the unremitting, inventive, energetic, and relentless persecution of Jews through a variety of instruments: from specialized state agencies, canon law, statutes, identification badges, registration procedures, and other apparatuses of surveillance and discipline to popular fictive rumors of Jewish malignity that were periodically refreshed by group consent through ritual iterations culminating in juridical execution and massacre; from political theologies that incrementally conceptualized a biopolitics of race to country-by-country forcible expulsions of Jews between 1290 and 1496.⁷

A diachronic empiricism concerned to add rather than subtract reality (Latour, “Why” 232) thus exposes “our Judeo-Christian heritage” as a political speech act of recent creation—with no historical pedigree—and allows medieval difference to return as a point of resistance to current political erasures enacted by converging temporalities within modernity. Additionally, a *critical* empiricism warns against strategies of overoptimistic historical recovery that might be otherwise imagined as sufficient in our troubled times. One of these is the belief that when we reteach students the debts in culture, mathematics, science, philosophy, and other knowledge the West owed to Islamdom during the Middle Ages and acknowledge the glories and accomplishments of the Islamic past—plumbing the cultural unconscious to restore the semi-repressed—a new appreciation for Muslims and Islamic cultures will ensue today.⁸ Here again diachronic example is instructive.

Persecutions of medieval Jews in the Latin Christian West pivoted on a strategic logic that introduced a cut in theological historiography to distinguish, and set apart, the admired ancient Hebrews and Israelites of the Old Testament from the reviled embodied medieval Jews living cheek-by-jowl alongside Christians in the cities and towns of Europe. The instrumentality of a cut facilitated a mechanism of supersession by means of which medieval Christians could view themselves as the present-day inheritors of ancient biblical scriptural traditions, allowing the Hebrews to be claimed for Christianity’s prehistory and grand narrative, even as it allowed medieval Christians to substitute themselves as the new chosen people, displacing and dispossessing medieval Jews. The ramifications of the logic of the cut have been extensively analyzed in medievalist scholarship on Jewish-Christian relations.⁹

Indeed, acts of strategic cutting cast a long shadow in the politics of the West. The narrative logic of *grands récits* like “the rise

of the West”—in the face of centuries of sophisticated advancements in knowledge, mathematics, science, firepower, steel and iron industries, print and paper, and credit and currency systems in the East, especially in India and China—depends on the instantiation of a cut to set aside predecessors and substitute in their place an ascendant West as uniquely different from and superseding earlier exemplars. It will not suffice, therefore, merely to rediscover to students the multilayered histories of medieval Islamdom’s accomplishments or the concomitant debts of the West, because the availability of a supersessionary argument—the cut between then and now—as an instrument for setting contemporary Islamicate societies apart from those in the past is readily at hand. Indeed, a cut of this kind was crucial in Lewis’s conjurations.¹⁰

Lewis’s drama of an ascendant, self-vindicating modern West against Islamicate societies superseded by “Western paramountcy” (“Roots” 3) is a theater of international relations that mimes medieval Christianity’s theopolitical drama of ascendancy and supersession exercised against Jews. As an enactment, Lewis’s drama also arrives with a report of the envy, humiliation, fear, desire, and vengeful hostility felt by the superseded and a representation of their communities and populations as undifferentiated—in this case, by virtue of being Islamic.¹¹ This is not to say that Lewis was indulging in an act of medievalism (though I admire the work of medievalists today researching medievalisms secreted in modernity in different registers) but rather to attest to actions of reinscription that occur across historical time. Such acts of reinscription are not reenactments without change, and invested acts of cutting in modern time are of course not identical to medieval acts of cutting. Getting closer to facts diachronically (but not further away from theory) grants a long view of history as repetitions with difference, not repetitions of the same.¹²

If the conundrums of theory today are formidably hydra-headed—in some academic neighborhoods, it’s the overconvergence of the state of theory with the state of the world, in the hands of the politically and ethically reprehensible; in other academic neighborhoods, it’s the lack of convergence, or, as Fernando Coronil puts it, the “inadequate connection” between academic studies (Coronil cites post-colonial theory) and the world (Yaeger 636)—one response might be a creative partnership with (dare I say it?) empirical data.¹³

In premodern studies, for example, some scholars of science and historical sociology in the last decades have assiduously researched demographic, economic, and scientific materialities across the globe to sketch a field of repeating modernities that have been instantiated (always with difference) in multiple vectors of the premodern world, moving at different rates of speed, across macrohistorical time. Robert Hartwell’s data tell us that seven hundred years before the West’s “Industrial Revolution” the tonnage of coal burned annually for iron production in eleventh-century northern China was already “roughly equivalent to 70% of the total amount of coal annually used by all metal workers in Great Britain at the beginning of the eighteenth century” (“Cycle” 122; also see Hartwell, “Revolution” 155). Demographic patterns deemed characteristic of modernity—like the ratio of urban populations to total population—have also appeared in premodernity (Goldstone 347).

The data, it seems, tell us that modernity is a repeating transhistorical syncopation with a material footprint in many parts of the world. Some scholars of science accordingly prefer to speak of scientific *revolutions* across time rather than *the* Scientific Revolution—a single, unique instance in a single, unique modernity (Hart, *Imagining Civilizations*, ch. 2; *Chinese Roots*; and “Great Explanandum”). Following that example, if we allow our field of vision to hatch open the nonidentical moments in premodernity that seem

to signal the activity of varied modernities in deep time (what Goldstone calls “efflorescences”), our expanded vision will likely yield windows on the past that could shift the terms and ground of reference in renegotiating the uses of the past.¹⁴

Geospatially, distributed modernities furnish material for counternarratives contesting the fiction of Western singularity enshrined, for instance, in the *grand récit* of the Industrial Revolution, eroding thus the discourse of Western exceptionalism. Macrotemporally, hatching open nonidentical moments in premodernity is what feminists and queer studies scholars have, in a sense, been doing for decades in staking out *their* European Middle Ages, even as their earliest archaeologies suffered slings and arrows hurled in the name of anachronism and presentism. But this is an argument with little room here, so perhaps another example might serve instead.

Coronil suggests that scrutinizing inscriptions lodged in a larger temporal register (and this is not a search for “origins”) might transform the “terms and references” of postcolonial theory (a slippery object of academic desire): “A view of colonialism as starting from the fifteenth century would offer a different understanding of modern colonialism and colonial modernity” (Yaeger 637). If a view of fifteenth-century colonialism shakes up frames of reference and understanding, what might a view of late-eleventh- and twelfth-century colonization yield? Here is the record of the twelfth-century chronicler Fulcher of Chartres describing western European occupation of territories in Syria and Palestine:

Consider, I pray, and reflect how in our time God has transformed the West into the East. For we who were Occidentals now have been made Orientals. He who was a Roman or a Frank is now a Galilaean, or an inhabitant of Palestine. One who was a citizen of Rheims or of Chartres now has been made a citizen of Tyre or of Antioch. We have already forgotten the places of our birth; already they have

become unknown to many of us, or, at least, are unmentioned. Some already possess here homes and servants which they have received through inheritance. Some have taken wives not merely of their own people, but Syrians, or Armenians, or even Saracens who have received the grace of baptism. . . . One cultivates vines, the other the fields. . . . Different languages, now made common, become known to both races, and faith unites those whose forefathers were strangers. . . . Those who were strangers are now natives; and he who was a sojourner now has become a resident. Our parents and relatives from day to day come to join us. . . . For those who were poor there, here God makes rich. Those who had few coins, here possess countless besants; and those who had not had a villa, here, by the gift of God, possess a city. Therefore, why should one who has found the East so favorable return to the West? . . . You see, therefore, that this is a great miracle, and one which must greatly astonish the world. Who has ever heard anything like it? (*History* 271–72)¹⁵

Recognition, surprise, difference, familiarity jostle together queerly and disorientingly for the modern postcolonial subject reading this statement of twelfth-century European colonization gone native, a statement that theorizes the mobility of place, citizenship, identity, language, sexuality, economic labor, socioeconomic status, religion, memory, and race as a multigenerational project articulated in a seductive language of power, superscripted by an affect of the uncanny. To look at modern colonial experiments anew, through the grid of this nine-hundred-year-old colonial experiment, allows for jolting reverberations otherwise inaudible to be heard and absorbed. (The haunting cadences lauding crusader colonization uncomfortably, shockingly reframe even the affective memory of other cadences where the poor and the wretched of a teeming shore are invited to find solace and wealth through overseas relocation.) Conversely, reading Fulcher’s “now” with the knowledge of later colonizations—accruing different moments of

the colonial “now”—makes us alive to the modernity of the past, to the panoply of resources that can be amassed to mystify operations of power, and to the sheer parsimony and resilience of colonial dialect. Who indeed has ever heard anything like it?¹⁶

In thus helping productively to disrupt theoretical generality and undo pseudo-historicist fabrications, a strategic return to a diachronic critical empiricism may be seen perhaps as a return movement of grounding theory back in different knowledges, in knowledges of difference. Strategic diachronicity allows for a repositioning of premodern data for counternarrations and urges us to revisit what we think we know about the past and about phenomena identified and located in modernity. But working backward and forward in time to see the structures and logics that got us to where we are—while admitting our investments in helping to produce a future that we want—is only a modest step in shifting terms and frames of reference.

For larger gains, it might be that we will also need to edge past our current knowledge-construction boundaries to make common-cause collaborations further afield—say, with the dreaded quantitative social sciences, with their own fidelities to data collection and empiricism, and with cybernetic science, with its massive capacity for vast, deep-structure modalities of analysis. These disciplines carry a different persuasional weight and heft from the humanities and are tasked with accountability in different analytic vocabularies from ours. These would be twenty-first-century alliances, made possible by parallel computing and petascale digital technologies, and may in a best-case scenario issue in mashups of qualitative and quantitative, multilayered modes of inquiry—microreading and macroreading performed as a single dance.

To grasp the fullest range of logics reticulating religion and secularity, premodernity and modernity, and wars designated as holy, a coalitional imperative of this sort would need

to distribute attention across the world. For instance, of the estimated 1.4 billion Muslims today, only fifteen percent are Arab, and—though Mideast variants of Islam garner the most attention—sixty percent live in Asia. The country with the world’s largest Islamic population, Indonesia, with 207 million Muslims, is famed for religious and cultural syncretism throughout its history of settlement, religious conversion, European colonization, and decolonization up to today, and for the political and cultural polymorphism of its Islam. Malaysia, with a Muslim majority of 15.5 million (60.4 percent of the total population), has successfully negotiated modernization. Closer to the West, Turkey is a Muslim-majority *secular* state that continually engages with Islam, nationalisms, and modernity through a variety of strategies.

In the face of peculiarly Mideast Islams that are being touted as universal and transcendent, Islamic heterogeneity deserves attention beyond lip service. This work demands the widest kinds of intricate, transdisciplinary, coalitional attentiveness, a willingness to think diachronically and across the planet. Like all ambitious collaborations, this will not be easy to attempt. But engaging with disciplines that ground knowledges differently, like engaging with the premodern past, can give us the capacity to see and hear that which we do not already understand, and productively disrupt the certitudes of what we think we already know.

Given the many kinds of impasse today, perhaps it’s time for theory to be open to the potentialities of an academic, intellectual crowdsourcing—inviting very unlike disciplines, the global South and North, and as-yet-unplumbed new technologies to enlarge the sense of who and what can be part of the conversation—en route to renegotiating relations between the state of the field and the state of the world.

NOTES

1. Counterarguments are posed by Naim; Qureshi and Sells, “Constructing”; Said; Trumpbour (who notes that the *Atlantic Monthly* article does not contain Lewis’s first use of the phrase); and Mottahedeh, inter alia. Social scientists analyzing data include Russett, Oneal, and Cox; Henderson and Tucker; Chiozza; Bolks and Stoll; and Neumayer and Plümper. Bottici and Challand are among the latest to trace the enduring power of the clash thesis, especially in the public sphere.

2. The orientalism of the official’s remark parallels the occidentalism of jihadi statements modeling a similar time consciousness: “They are determined to continue with their Crusader campaigns against our nation, to occupy our countries, to plunder our resources and to enslave us” (Bin Laden, qtd. in Whitlock).

3. Jenny Wenzel cites another example of theoretical best practices gone awry, in “the infamous dismissal of the ‘reality-based community’ by an unnamed Bush administration official in 2004: ‘We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities.’ . . . What’s more startling than the bald assertion of United States empire as a fait accompli is the way in which it is informed (however perversely) by Said’s critique of orientalist knowledge production and its construction of reality” (Yaeger 634).

4. Critiques of temporal bifurcation have been driven by varied concerns, among them literary history (Summit and Wallace), stories of reading and queer relationalities (Dinshaw), epistemologies of feudalism and sovereignty (Davis), the politics of racial formation (Heng, “Invention . . . I” and “Invention . . . II”), and the politics of knowledge formation and disciplinary formation (Biddick, *Typological Imaginary*).

5. Holsinger, *Neomedievalism*, and Lampert have excellent rhetorical analyses of “the medieval” in contemporary political speech and writing; Holsinger also discusses the medieval in tropes, themes, and examples manipulated by academic theorists and in the education and training of the academic theorists themselves (*Premodern Condition*). Davis considers the medieval as a postsecular presence in modernity. These are just a handful of examples in a fast-growing body of work on “medievalism,” loosely understood as the postmedieval invocation of the Middle Ages in everything from popular culture to disciplinary history and formation to politics to built environments, inter alia. Ganim is an important recent example, Biddick, *Shock*, an influential earlier example. Davis and Altschul’s recent anthology offers euromedievalisms imported and transmogrified around the world, in postcolonies as well as in colonial and neocolonial spaces.

6. In this they differ from medievalists, for some of whom the recovery of the medieval within modernity—one means of contesting “periodization” or “periodicity”—

tends toward a collapse of categories, so that *medieval* and *modern* are increasingly rendered indifferent. Davis’s re-statement, *pace* Latour (*We*), that “we have never been modern,” in her beautifully written and meticulously argued recent book—issuing in her critique of work like James Simpson’s, which assumes that “there *was* such a thing as the Middle Ages and ‘Renaissance’”—comes to mind (19).

7. The scholarship on this topic is vast. For a range of representative work, see Roth; Rubin; Cohen, *Friars, Living Letters*, and *From Witness*; Wood; Skinner; Mundill; Trachtenberg; Hood; Stow; Dundes; Kruger.

8. Western debt to Islamdom has not been fully repressed by foundational historiography, though it may be underemphasized today. This is not to say we should not teach that debt—the imperative to teach an intercultural Middle Ages also underpins my own practice and embeds autocritique—but only to say that the practice, while necessary, is insufficient of itself.

9. In recent years, much of this work has been influenced directly or indirectly by Fabian’s politics of temporality. Biddick’s *Typological Imaginary* offers one of the most incisively theorized accounts of medieval Christendom’s temporal politics. I apologize for naming representative exemplars rather than offering a full citational apparatus in this short essay.

10. Another way to minimize Arabic and Islamic civilizations even in premodernity is to depict them as carrier civilizations between Greco-Roman antiquity and Latin Christendom, playing the role merely of conduit.

11. “*The Muslim* has suffered successive stages of defeat. . . . The first was his loss of domination. . . . The second was the undermining of his authority. . . . The third . . . was the challenge to his mastery. . . . It was too much to endure. . . . It was also natural that this rage should be directed primarily against the millennial enemy”; “a feeling of humiliation—a growing awareness, among the heirs of an old, proud, and long dominant civilization, of having been overtaken, overborne, and overwhelmed by those whom they regarded as their inferiors” (Lewis, “Roots” 3, 9; emphasis added).

12. Interesting alternative views of temporality are thus possible: we may see historical time and events, inter alia, as a matrix of overlapping repetitions with change or as a field of dynamic oscillations between ruptures and reinscriptions or—the view conjured in this essay—as enfolded temporalities coextant within a historical moment.

13. Coronil, rephrasing Wenzel, emphasizes “a growing concern” in postcolonial studies “with the ever more clearly inadequate connection between ‘the state of the field and the state of the world’” (Yaeger 636).

14. This is not to say we should cease focusing on modernity and modern medievalisms but to urge a simultaneous focus on premodernity that is open to what we do not already know about the past.

15. The original passage is Fulcher, *Historia* 748–49. I discuss medieval colonization of the Near East in detail in *Empire of Magic*, including crusader cannibalism of

Muslim Turks, the infernal enemy in the East, in an era of Eucharistic cannibalism. Overseas extraterritoriality of the crusader kind differs somewhat from local invasions of contiguous European territories—like Anglo-Norman England’s colonization of neighboring Ireland, Scotland, and Wales—because of a plethora of issues that include religion, race, multinational militarism, and scale.

16. Fulcher’s testimony also registers the work of having to account for the unintelligibility of these events. In my sixteen years of teaching the literature and culture of the Crusades, nothing has been more insistently striking to my students than the lack of resemblance and relation among the Crusades—any of the Crusades—from the first to the last, however many Crusades one thinks there are, and however one sorts them. Yet despite the aporetic status of these extraterritorial phenomena, the Crusades are cited in the academy and in the public sphere today as if they were known and their meaning thus at the disposal of all, wherever one’s attitudes toward them might fall on the political spectrum.

WORKS CITED

- “Al Qaeda’s Summer Plans.” *Newsweek*. Harman Newsweek, 2 June 2003. Web. 10 Dec. 2010.
- Biddick, Kathleen. *The Shock of Medievalism*. Durham: Duke UP, 1998. Print.
- . *The Typological Imaginary: Circumcision, Technology, History*. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2003. Print.
- Bin Laden, Osama. “Bin Laden Rails against Crusaders and UN.” *BBC News*. BBC, 3 Nov. 2001. Web. 9 Dec. 2010.
- . “West Is on a Crusade: Bin Laden.” *BBC News*. BBC, 23 Apr. 2006. Web. 9 Dec. 2010.
- Bolks, Sean, and Richard Stoll. “Examining Conflict Escalation within the Civilizations Context.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 20.1 (2003): 85–109. Print.
- Bottici, Chiara, and Benoît Challand. *The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations*. New York: Routledge, 2010. Print.
- Bush, George W. “Bush Talks about Crusade on Sep 16-2001.” *YouTube*. YouTube, 12 Mar. 2008. Web. 18 Mar. 2011.
- Chiozza, Giacomo. “Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict Involvement, 1946–97.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39.6 (2002): 711–34. Print.
- Cohen, Jeremy, ed. *The Friars and the Jews: The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1982. Print.
- . *From Witness to Witchcraft: Jews and Judaism in Medieval Christian Thought*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997. 221–45. Print.
- . *Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1999. Print.
- Davis, Kathleen. *Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time*. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2008. Print.
- Davis, Kathleen, and Nadia Altschul, eds. *Medievalisms in the Postcolonial World*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2009. Print.
- Dimock, Wai-Chee. *Through Other Continents: American Literature across Deep Time*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2006. Print.
- Dinshaw, Carolyn. *Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre- and Postmodern*. Durham: Duke UP, 1999. Print.
- Dundes, Alan, ed. *The Blood Libel Legend: A Casebook in Anti-Semitic Folklore*. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1991. Print.
- Fabian, Johannes. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*. New York: Columbia UP, 1983. Print.
- Fulcher of Chartres. *Historia Hierosolymitana (1095–1127)*. Ed. Heinrich Hagenmeyer. Heidelberg: Winters, 1913. Print.
- . *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 1095–1127*. Ed. Harold S. Fink. Trans. Frances Rita Ryan. Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 1969. Print.
- Ganim, John. *Medievalism and Orientalism: Three Essays on Literature, Architecture, and Cultural Identity*. New York: Palgrave, 2005. Print.
- Goldstone, Jack A. “Efflorescences and Economic Growth in World History: Rethinking the ‘Rise of the West’ and the Industrial Revolution.” *Journal of World History* 13.2 (2002): 323–89. Print.
- Goodstein, Laurie. “Around Country, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition.” *New York Times* 8 Aug. 2010: 1, 17. Print.
- Hart, Roger. *The Chinese Roots of Linear Algebra*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2010. Print.
- . “The Great Explanandum.” *American Historical Review* 105.2 (2000): 486–93. Print.
- . *Imagining Civilizations: China, the West, and Their First Encounter*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2011. Print.
- Hartwell, Robert. “A Cycle of Economic Change in Imperial China: Coal and Iron in Northeast China, 750–1350.” *Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient* 10 (1967): 102–59. Print.
- . “A Revolution in the Chinese Iron and Coal Industries during the Northern Sung, 960–1126 A.D.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 21.2 (1962): 153–62. Print.
- Henderson, Errol A., and Richard Tucker. “Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict.” *International Studies Quarterly* 45.2 (2001): 317–38. Print.
- Heng, Geraldine. *Empire of Magic: Medieval Romance and the Politics of Cultural Fantasy*. 2003. New York: Columbia UP, 2004. Print.
- . “The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages I: Race Studies, Modernity, and the Middle Ages.” *Literature Compass*, forthcoming.

- . “The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages II: Locations of Medieval Race.” *Literature Compass*, forthcoming.
- Holsinger, Bruce. *Neomedievalism, Neoconservatism, and the War on Terror*. New York: Prickly Paradigm, 2007. Print.
- . *The Premodern Condition: Medievalism and the Making of Theory*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005. Print.
- Hood, John Y. B. *Aquinas and the Jews*. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1995. Print.
- Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*. Council on Foreign Relations, 1993. Web. 9 Dec. 2010.
- . *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon, 1996. Print.
- Kruger, Steven. *The Spectral Jew: Conversion and Embodiment in Medieval Europe*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2006. Print.
- Lampert, Lisa. “Race, Periodicity, and the (Neo-) Middle Ages.” *Modern Language Quarterly* 65.3 (2004): 392–421. Print.
- Latour, Bruno. *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society*. Milton Keynes: Open UP, 1987. Print.
- . *We Have Never Been Modern*. Trans. Catherine Porter. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993. Print.
- . “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern.” *Critical Inquiry* 30.2 (2004): 225–48. Print.
- Lewis, Bernard. “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified.” *Atlantic Monthly*. Atlantic Monthly Group, Sept. 1990. Web. 9 Dec. 2010.
- . *What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*. New York: Harper, 2002. Print.
- Mottahedeh, Roy P. “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique.” Qureshi and Sells, *New Crusades* 131–51.
- Mundill, Robin R. *England’s Jewish Solution: Experiment and Expulsion, 1262–1290*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print.
- Naim, C. M. “The Outrage of Bernard Lewis.” *Social Text* 30 (1992): 114–20. Print.
- Neumayer, Eric, and Thomas Plümper. “International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations.” *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (2009): 711–34. Print.
- Qureshi, Emran, and Michael A. Sells. “Constructing the Muslim Enemy.” Introduction. Qureshi and Sells, *New Crusades* 1–47.
- , eds. *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*. New York: Columbia UP, 2003. Print.
- Roth, Cecil. *A History of the Jews in England*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1941. Print.
- Rubin, Miri. *Gentile Tales: The Narrative Assault on Late Medieval Jews*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1999. Print.
- Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox. “Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence.” *Journal of Peace Research* 37.5 (2000): 583–608. Print.
- Said, Edward W. “The Clash of Definitions.” Qureshi and Sells, *New Crusades* 68–87.
- Skinner, Patricia. *The Jews in Medieval Britain: Historical, Literary and Archaeological Perspectives*. Woodbridge: Boydell, 2003. Print.
- Stow, Kenneth R. *Alienated Minority: The Jews of Medieval Latin Europe*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992. Print.
- Summit, Jennifer, and David Wallace. “Rethinking Periodization.” *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 37.3 (2007): 447–51. Print.
- Trachtenberg, Joshua. *The Devil and the Jews: The Medieval Conception of the Jew and Its Relation to Modern Antisemitism*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1943. Print.
- Trumpbour, John. “The Clash of Civilizations: Samuel P. Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and the Remaking of the Post-Cold War World Order.” Qureshi and Sells, *New Crusades* 88–130.
- Whitlock, Craig. “On Tape, Bin Laden Warns of Long War.” *Washington Post* 24 Apr. 2008: A01. Print.
- Wood, Diana, ed. *Christianity and Judaism*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. Print.
- World Islamic Front. “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.” *Federation of American Scientists*. Federation of American Scientists, 23 Feb. 1998. Web. 9 Dec. 2010.
- Yaeger, Patricia. “Editor’s Column: The End of Postcolonial Theory? A Roundtable with Sunil Agnani, Fernando Coronil, Gaurav Desai, Mamadou Diouf, Simon Gikandi, Susie Tharu, and Jennifer Wenzel.” *PMLA* 122.3 (2007): 633–51. Print.