

Dogma-Line Racism

Islamophobia and the Second Axis of Race

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Now that there is and can be no longer an exclusive national religion, tolerance should be given to all religions that tolerate others, so long as their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of citizenship. But whoever dares to say: “Outside the Church is no salvation,” ought to be driven from the State, unless the State is the Church, and the prince the pontiff. Such a dogma is good only in a theocratic government; in any other it is fatal.

—Jean Jacques Rousseau

I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.

—George W. Bush

The *goyim* are a flock of sheep, and we are their wolves. And you know what happens when the wolves get hold of the flock?

—“Protocols of the Elders of Zion”

The decade since September 11, 2001, has witnessed a range of what could be called racializing practices aimed at Muslims and Middle Easterners. These include revived tactics of state power, including indefinite detention, undercover entrapment campaigns, expanded surveillance, the special

registration of travelers from Arab and Muslim majority nations, as well as the use of torture as a technique for extracting “confessions.” These state-based techniques, meanwhile, take place amidst a plethora of highly politicized media events like the Ground Zero mosque controversy or the efforts in a dozen states to ban legal considerations of Sharia law, which position Muslims as a population that harbors enemies of the body politic.

Nevertheless, if this is a form of race making, its relationship to what Americans have come to call the *color line* is far from obvious. It is not simply that some figures like alleged terror conspirator “Jihad Jane” or John Walker Lindh, the so-called American Taliban, are white nor that the new enemy of the war on terror has somehow eased the inclusion of people of color as part of an embattled America. It is not even that Arabs are positioned ambiguously in relation to the color line. Rather, as Moustafa Bayoumi suggests, it is that the racialization of Arabs in America has never been understood as a matter of the “color of one’s skin” but instead as a fluctuating, geopolitically motivated judgment about Islam.¹

This essay attempts to theorize what “making a race out of a religion” has actually entailed, both over the *long durée* and under current conditions. In particular, I will suggest that religion is not merely one more semiotic coordinate, alongside the codes of descent, phenotype, cultural identity, through which bodies become racially ascribed as white or nonwhite. Rather, a careful consideration of Islamophobia demonstrates that religion (and by extension, all ideology) has historically generated a supplemental racial dynamic that cannot be reduced to the assignation of color, although it interacts with it.² This is an idea that our first great theorist of the color line, W. E. B. Du Bois, himself suggested in a late essay titled “The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto.” Du Bois there observes that what he had learned in Warsaw was not so much something about the Jew as a new insight into the history of the “American Negro,” namely, that “the problem of slavery, emancipation, and caste in the United States was no longer in my mind a separate and unique thing as I had so long conceived it. It was not even solely a matter of color and physical and racial characteristics, which was particularly a hard thing for me to learn, since for a lifetime the color line had been a real and efficient cause of misery.”³

The so-called problem of the color line was embedded, Du Bois suggested, in a larger ensemble of racial strategies. These strategies have constituted the historical life and social death of other populations yet have been equally relevant to the racialization of American blacks.

What then does Islamophobia teach us about the wider strategies of race making in America, and elsewhere? What social and political effects supplemental to those of color making does it enact? And through what genealogies of race, religion, and power might we frame its present operations? The challenge of analyzing what Du Bois termed in his essay the

“broader conception” of the race problem, the historical flexibility of race-making practices, particularly as it concerns the relevance of Islamophobia to the historical trajectories of race, has been explored in strikingly different ways by Étienne Balibar, Mahmood Mamdani, Gil Anidjar, David Theo Goldberg, George Fredrickson, and Bob Meister, among others.⁴ Following in their footsteps, this essay will aim to defamiliarize both the current action and the *long durée* of race through a reframing of both its scope and history. What I hope to make visible is a supplemental racial practice, typified by Islamophobia, that has always operated alongside the more familiar mode of racism in America through which “whites” are distinguished from “people of color.”

Like the color line, this second axis of race has a venerable history as a strategy of power. It finds its earliest origins in religious distinctions between the Christian flock and its enemies as they were constituted by the regime of power that Michel Foucault once called the “pastorate” of premodern Europe.⁵ With the rise of the modern governmental state, this politico-theological enemy of the Middle Ages was translated in secular terms as a figure for ideological threats to civil order. A supplement to racisms of the color line, this mode of what I shall call *dogma-line racism* maps populations along the other side of Cartesian modernity’s mind/body split, in primary reference to mind rather than body, ideology rather than corporeality, according to theologies, creeds, beliefs, faiths, and ideas, rather than their color, face, hair, blood, and origin.

It is crucial to see that, historically speaking, these two axes of race *have not operated separately* upon mutually exclusive populations but rather propped one another up and comingled in complex ways. Indeed, I am inclined to view them as mutually dependent upon one another. Whereas color generally produces codes of superiority and inferiority—what Balibar once described as a spectrum that runs from humanity to animality—dogma supplies a second theme that supplements and completes the racialization process by generating the distinction that Carl Schmitt once considered the essence of politics: that of friend and enemy.⁶ Dogma refracts racial difference so that it appears through the lens of potential warfare. For our current context, therefore, the more sophisticated question is to consider how the permanent “war on terror” of our age, like early ones, makes its own simultaneous yet novel uses of both color and dogma—racisms of both body and soul—to mark a break in the population between those who are threatened by terror and those who encapsulate the threat.

The Second Axis of Race at Work

The operation of race’s second axis today can be readily investigated by simply reflecting upon my peculiar appeal to the conjunction “Arabs *and/or*

Muslims” when characterizing the racial targets of the war on terror. In so doing, I am in very good company. Inderpal Grewal furnishes us with another typical example of this phenomenon when she claims that, after 9/11, “*the Muslim or Middle Easterner* became American nationalism’s new racial Other” (emphasis mine).⁷ So too does legal theorist Leti Volpp, when she explores the post-9/11 racial profiling of those who appear “‘Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim.’”⁸

Why do we need this conjunctive formulation? Neither Grewal nor Volpp nor I mean to suggest that *Arab* (or *Middle Eastern*) and *Muslim* are mutually exclusive, and yet, if the two words are meant to connote more or less the same group, what requires the repetition? Does the latter term add something to the former? Or is it the other way around? How are they connected in both the practice and the imagination of race?

“Arab” conforms in some way to the traditional US ethnic studies model: it delineates an ethnicity and a culture linked to geographic origin that can become a hyphenated identity.⁹ “Middle Eastern,” meanwhile, suggests a region, akin for example to “Asian,” “Latin American,” or “South Asian.” Both “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” name the *marked* target of the “war on terror,” and it is for this reason that many observers have discussed the vulnerability of even those who might *look* Arab to agents of the security state—including Sikhs, Iranians, or (for that matter) even Armenians. There is no question that the “war on terror” has engaged in such relatively familiar forms of bodily racialization. But it seems necessary to add “Muslim” to any of these because the corporeally signified cultural and regional designations are not adequate to the production of the war target.

In attaching the “Muslim” to Arab or Middle Eastern, several paradoxes are introduced. A majority of Arabs in the United States, for instance, are actually Christian. The majority of Muslims in the United States are not Arab, and many are not even Middle Eastern; there are approximately an equal number of African American Black Muslims and perhaps twice as many South Asian Muslims in the United States as there are Arab Muslims.¹⁰ There are also Iranian, African, Turkish, Indonesian, and East European Muslims in the United States.

Color-line racism, as we now know, is a highly complex strategy of power that—its tacit appeal to phenotypical distinctions notwithstanding—actually operates by mobilizing an ever-changing array of social narratives, habits of perception, and performative practices through which populations are distinguished and administered.¹¹ Nevertheless, a naturalistic reference to differentiated human embodiment remains its ideological kernel. Color-based categories of race proceed on an ideological basis *as if* the divides in the population that they produce either are or should be visibly marked as distinctions between the white and the black, brown, or

Asian body. To paraphrase Slavoj Žižek, its formulation might be, I know very well that I cannot always tell when someone is African American, but still I behave as if blackness is something I can see.¹² The very *idea* of color registers this presumption of visual perceptibility.

The racial targeting associated with the war on terror, however, presupposes a different risk associated with the idea of the *unmarked* body: the person who can slide right past airport security with a shoe bomb. Its practices allude to a mode of racialization whose ideological kernel is *non-corporeal*, one that presupposes distinctions lodged instead in the *mental or psychopolitical life* of the threatening figure and the population that it represents. When one seeks historical analogs, an unexpected reference point turns out to be the Nazi propaganda film *Der Ewige Jude* (*The Eternal Jew*), in which what makes the Jew so dangerous is that, while he or she is *sometimes* identifiable by clothing, noses, beards, and so forth, there are other times when the Jew blends in or passes, becoming the perfectly camouflaged enemy within.¹³ Indeed, in a particularly telling scene, *Der Ewige Jude* depicts the bearded face of a traditional Jew, dressed in yarmulke and orthodox garb, only to dissolve the shot into another image of the same face, now clean-shaven and wearing a modern suit (fig. 1). Corporeally indistinguishable from genuine German or European citizens, Jews constitute, in the film's conspiratorial logic, a "sleeper cell" in the national body politic.



Figure 1. Marked and unmarked Jew in *Der Ewige Jude* (dir. Fritz Hippler, 1940)

Precisely in the context of surveying "neoracisms," including contemporary Islamophobia in Europe, Balibar has discussed such potentially unmarked raciality, a kind of "racism without race" that he too associates with the peculiarities of anti-Semitism, wherein "admittedly, bodily stigmata play a great role in its phantasmatics, but they do so more as signs of a deep psychology, as signs of a spiritual inheritance rather than a biologi-

cal heredity. These signs are, so to speak, the more revealing for being the less visible and the Jew is more ‘truly’ a Jew the more indiscernible he is.”¹⁴

While this is precisely the kind of racism that this essay investigates, it is important to see that the Jew is not its unique representative. Given that the very idea of anti-Semitism originally served to conjoin Jew and Muslim together into a unitary threat (as both Anidjar and Ivan Davidson Kalmar remind us), and given that other populations have also been targeted at various historical moments for the invisible danger posed by their outlooks, including Catholics, communists, anarchists, or black-power activists, we can subsume all of these, along with anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, into a broader modern formation that I will call dogma-line racism.¹⁵

We must be careful about what distinguishes this kind of racism. The point is not, for example, that the color line always produces a racism of marked bodies, as every racial passing narrative reminds us. And while Balibar’s formulation does capture something of the dogma line’s characteristic anxiety about the discernability of target populations, it ultimately only confuses matters to call the dogma line a “racism without race.”¹⁶ Even when color is not there, race assuredly is. Indeed, as the first, Jewishly garbed image from *Der Ewige Jude* demonstrates, or as Frantz Fanon also showed in regards to French perceptions of Arab women resistance fighters in his essay “Algeria Unveiled,” dogma-line racism sometimes may even traffic explicitly in marked bodies.¹⁷ What ideologically distinguishes this racism, rather, is its ideological axiomatic: it proceeds *as if* its racial other either *was* or *could be* corporeally undetectable. To wit, I know very well that I can sometimes recognize a Muslim on sight. Still, they must always be concealing themselves.

How exactly does this racism of the dogma line interact with the more familiar terms of color-line racism, and what might it add to the strategies of racial power? Some interesting answers emerge if we compare *Der Ewige Jude* to *Sleeper Cell*, a post-9/11 TV show that, along with *24*, pioneered the propagandistic common sense of the war on terror in American popular culture. *Sleeper Cell* dramatizes the story of an underground FBI agent, Darwyn, who has been sent on a mission to infiltrate an underground radical Muslim terror group bent on a major attack in Los Angeles. Initially, however, Darwyn is simply introduced to us as an African American convert to Islam who is about to be released from prison.¹⁸ On the day he prepares to go free, Darwyn’s religious guide gives Darwyn the key to a locker within which he will later find a copy of the Qu’ran and, inside it, a scrap of paper listing a street address. Of all places, this address leads him to a synagogue. When Darwyn enters it in the midst of services, visibly wearing his *taqiyah*, or Muslim prayer cap, one of the Jews berates his presumed anti-Semitic motives: Darwyn must be one of those intolerant Muslims who wants to see firsthand the people whom, according to the Qu’ran, Allah will turn into



Figure 2. Black Muslim and “Jew” face off in the “Al Faitha” episode of *Sleeper Cell*, aired 4 December 2005 (dir. Clark Johnson, Showtime Network)

dogs and swine. Ironically then, this Jew accuses him of precisely the violent hatefulness characterizing the terrorist group that, we will later learn, Darwyn seeks to infiltrate. The ironies only mount when, upon stepping outside the synagogue, the “Jew” unexpectedly asks Darwyn in Arabic to complete a verse of the Qu’ran. As the viewer and Darwyn simultaneously discover, this man is actually his undercover contact, Farik, leader of the eponymous sleeper cell (fig. 2).

In *Der Ewige Jude*, our recognition of the conspiratorial danger depends upon the yoking together of the two images: the clean-shaven Jew (who can pass as German) and the religiously marked Jew (who shows us who he *really* is on the inside). In the twenty-first century America of *Sleeper Cell*, by contrast, it is the face of the practicing, marked Jew that is manifestly safe, so that pretending to be one offers the dangerous Islamist Farik a mask with which he can disguise himself. And yet, since it turns out that the person who looked like a Jew in a synagogue can actually be the chief terrorist, something of *Der Ewige Jude*’s conspiratorial anti-Semitic paranoia is preserved at a deeper level.

Farik’s bodily appearance does bear a kind of racial marking, identifying him as Middle Eastern in origin, but as he tells Darwyn, that means he can pass as Turkish, Persian, or even a Sephardic Jew. In reality, the role of Farik is played by Israeli actor Oded Fehr, a Sephardic Jew playing an Arab terrorist who is himself playing a Sephardic Jew. In other words, it is precisely because of the slippage between (1) Middle Easterners who signify the dangerous class of Muslim Arabs, (2) Middle Easterners who don’t count as the dangerous class (Sephardic Jews, Armenians, Sikhs, possibly

Christian Arabs), and (3) those who merely “look Middle Eastern” (perhaps even including Latinos or anyone brown) that racial marking can paradoxically function as a disguise for the figure of the terrorist. To add to the TV show’s racial complications, Farik shortly thereafter instructs Darwyn to remove his prayer cap so that he too can pass as a “mere” African American, presumably as a light-skinned African American might once have passed as white or as the “eternal Jew” once passed among good Europeans.¹⁹

What is at stake in the complex play of marked and unmarked, dangerous and safe racialities that operate in this popular terror-war program? What does it mean that the racism specific to the war on terror presupposes a potentially unmarked racial enemy who can camouflage himself or herself against the more conventional markers of color? I would suggest that shows like *Sleeper Cell* and *24* in effect train their audiences into envisioning the field of race in stereo, tacking between the color and dogma axes to produce a racially diverse range of potential enemies.

Consider, for instance, John Walker Lindh, the white, middle-class Marin County man who was captured in Afghanistan early on in the war on terror. Nicknamed the American Taliban by American press outlets, Lindh came to represent the capacity of corporeal whiteness to conceal within it the disloyalty of an extremist “Muslim outlook.” And yet, his media narrative also drew upon a certain representation of whiteness, one akin to Marie’s in *24*: the latte-sipping limousine-liberalism of northern California, which epitomizes for some conservatives the treasonous disloyalty of the post-sixties white Left. Lindh’s case may be contrasted to that of José Padilla, one of the few US citizens to be classified as an enemy combatant, whom the Bush administration placed in a military brig for three years without right to a trial. Padilla, a second-generation Puerto Rican, was imprisoned earlier in his life as a member of the Latin Kings gang. While serving this sentence, he converted to Islam. In May 2002, he was seized a second time by the US government to be accused of a dirty bomb plot. In the end, when these charges could not be substantiated, he was charged instead simply with “conspiracy” for having consorted with Islamic fundamentalists.²⁰ In the displaced racial logic of his case, Padilla’s past as a Puerto Rican gang member was retroactively assimilated to the criminalizing frame of homeland security, then used to substantiate the Islamist link.

These two cases can in turn be held alongside the right-wing “birther” conspiracy theory that Barack Obama is secretly a Muslim who attended a Madrassa during his childhood in Indonesia. The implicit logic of this narrative was distilled with particular vividness in the *New Yorker*’s controversial parodic cover image of a turbaned Barack and a fully armed-with-afro Michelle Obama bumping fists inside the Oval Office while an American flag burns under a hanging portrait of Osama bin Laden (fig. 3). This image portrays a malicious intention, carefully hidden by Michelle



Figure 3. Barack and Michelle Obama as the marriage of Muslim and Black Power “threats” to America. Barry Blitt, “Fist Bump,” 21 July 2008 cover, *New Yorker* © Condé Nast

and Barack Obama, that we can only witness through the private tableau of the Oval Office. To create this enemy, the image condenses the bogey of the post-sixties black militant with the post-9/11 Islamic threat, producing out of the combination a singular notion of violent anti-American radicals doing their dirty work under cover. Obama is simultaneously the heir of Malcolm X, Bill Ayers, *and* Osama bin Laden: the Trojan horse of a black power–jihadist conspiracy has arrived at last within the Oval Office. But the image also tacitly implies that blackness is not enough to reveal the Obaman conspiracy, that we would need access to this perceptually inaccessible *mise-en-scène* to know them for who they really are.

Considered collectively, Lindh, Padilla, and Obama illustrate how quite different connotations of color (white California liberalism, Puerto Rican criminality, black militancy) can alternately serve to reinforce an Islamophobic racism of interiority. Once we have discovered Lindh in Afghanistan, Padilla with his conspirators, or Obama in this transformed Oval Office, these narratives retroactively read the telltale signs on the racial body for what should have been noticed in the first place. But these cases are also animated by a fear that the moment of recognition may come too late or not at all: the body can successfully disguise the disloyalty that it contains. All three examples thus concern figures who have been subjected to the double action of the two axes of race, as they produce, through their triangulation, the war on terror's friend-enemy distinction.

Genealogies of the Dogma Line

The axis of the color line has been studied with great sophistication in ethnic and American studies, as well as in critical race theory. The second axis has not, perhaps in part because it has led a more subtextual politico-cultural existence but also because it often disavows its status as a racial formation. This disavowal can only be unpacked by tracing the long genealogy of the interpenetrations of religious and racial discourse. As a contribution to this task, I will offer a speculative consideration of three key moments in the history of the dogma line, each of which clarifies its military logic, its status as racial supplement, and its critical importance to writing a genealogy of modern power. I will begin with the dogma line's origins in the pastoral power of high-medieval Christendom. I will then turn to its mutation into an early modern racial formation, including its complex relation to the origins of the color line during the Ibero-American birth of the modern world system. Finally, I will examine the secular translation of the dogma line that accompanied the emergence of Westphalian governmental strategy and that prepared the ground for the dogma line's resurgence today as a military logic of race-religion.

Dogma-line racism, I will argue, has been a continuous element in the

strategy of power that Michel Foucault specified as governmentality, in the following sense: it has allowed laws, interrogations, and various other political or military techniques to regulate populations toward some productive end. Its aim, we might say, is to police rather than to rule. Nevertheless, what I will be describing is not the linear or progressive history of a racial category but rather a genealogy that reveals certain family resemblances as emergent regimes of power adapt and redeploy dogma-line techniques to manage different populations for ever-new ends.

In one collection of his lectures, *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault identified the primary precursor of modern governmentality in what he called the pastoral power of the medieval Church.²¹ Pastoral power involved neither the control of territory nor the exercise of divine will. Rather, it concerned the shepherding of the flock, the managing of the population of believers. The Church's charge was to watch and care, indeed to *minister* to its population so as to gather them as a docile body of the faithful upon which God might look favorably.

The term *pastoral*, however, should not distract us from the fact that this pastoral power was premised upon a condition of permanent war. At the zenith of the "pastorate," between 900 and 1300 CE, the population ministered by the Church became known as *Corpus Christianus*, or *Christianitas*, the deterritorialized political body known in English as *Christendom*. In this period, the pope and Church actively sought to eliminate the private wars routinely fought in the early middle ages between various Christian princes by calling for a "truce of God" that would gather and align the forces of Christendom. But, as Tomaz Mastnak shows in his brilliant study, *Crusading Peace*, this pacification was premised precisely upon the outward redirection of the military impulse in the Crusades, which elevated the Muslim world above all other pagan powers as the Enemy of God, and thus the proper adversary in a perpetual just war.²² Mastnak's and Foucault's analyses are not only deeply compatible but mutually illuminating. The logic of tending the flock has always had a military dimension. It is no coincidence that the biblical figure of King David, as the generative figure of the shepherd, is also renowned as a warrior. The shepherd who ministers to the sheep is also he who watches and defends against the wolves or thieves that might steal them away. Christendom constituted the corporate body of believers precisely by mobilizing the pastoral body for permanent war against Jew and Arab, those whom Anidjar has termed the West's permanent "theological enemy."²³

It is relevant, in other words, that the military pastorate of the Crusades also occasionally turned its forces against the Jews of Europe, whose persecution skyrocketed as a direct result of Crusader ventures in this period. The Saracens and Jews were yoked together as intimate adversaries

of Christendom, as twin threats to the flock, through a dense articulation of politico-theological and historico-military themes. On the theological side, if both Muslims and Jews claimed to worship the biblical God, and if they had received the gospel only to reject it, then they could be treated as more than mere pagans (nonbelievers), as infidels (nonfaithful ones or disbelievers), and thus as threshold heretics (misbelievers) whose doctrinal misunderstandings threatened proper Christian conduct. On the military side, Jews were influential in the Islamic world of that era and therefore perceived to be the Saracens' allies in the contexts of the Crusades.²⁴

In the medieval pastorate, therefore, we have a number of elements that can be traced forward in time: first, a politics of population that is organized around the logic of a just, permanent war against those who constitute a dogmatic threat to the flock; then, the production of the Jew and Muslim as the quasi-heretical enemies who constituted this threat from outside the flock; and finally, therefore, an incipient dogma line, the separation of the populations into those whose normative faith is threatened, as opposed to those whose dogmas constitute the threat to the flock. We are converging here with the practices of power that Foucault explored in another collection of his lectures, *Society Must Be Defended*, namely, the paradigm of war.²⁵ Foucault placed the origins of this paradigm only in relationship to an early modern nativist language of race and did not trace it as far back as the era of the pastorate. Yet, as the history of the Crusades attests, the linkages between these two genealogies deserve further consideration.

Conquista and Reconquista: The Twin Birth of the Two Axes of Race

For most scholars working in the world-system tradition, like Anibal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein, the pastoral enemy bears no strong relationship to the modern categories of race and racism.²⁶ Rather, it was the colonization and reorganization of the Americas as the periphery of the nascent world system that gave birth to the classification of the world's population by race. For Quijano, race represents precisely the categories of color-line racism or, as he puts it, a "codification of the differences between conquerers and conquered" in an idea that would eventually take the form of a global color line distinguishing the peoples of the core and the periphery of the world system.²⁷ And yet, Quijano himself observes the curious fact that "race appears much earlier than color in the history of social classification of the global population." By this he means that, although some kind of codification of the natural difference between Spaniard and Indian emerged very quickly after the *conquista*, "there are no are no traces of these categories [of color] in the chronicles and other documents from the first one hundred years of Iberian colonialism in

America.”²⁸ In what exactly might this notion of race before color actually have consisted, and from whence might it have come?

In Spain and Portugal, during the centuries of the *reconquista* (reconquest) that preceded New World colonization, the status of the Jewish and Muslim pastoral enemy was particularly acute, taking on as it did a condition of permanent localized war. In 1391, a wave of pogroms led to a mass conversion of Jews to Christianity in order to escape the sword. But the striking consequence of this, as Benzion Netanyahu has shown in his comprehensive study, is that the descendants of these converts, thereafter known as Conversos, Marranos, or Cristianos Nuevos, continued to be perceived as an enemy, and this led, in fact, to the founding of two institutions: the Spanish Inquisition, dedicated to rooting out conspirators from among this population, as well as the statutes of *limpieza de sangre*, or blood purity, which required those seeking positions of public or ecclesiastical authority to request that the Inquisition document their old Christian, that is, non-Jewish (and later non-Moorish) ancestry.²⁹ Netanyahu argues that this phenomenon functioned as an incipient racial theory, a prototypical distinction of populations based upon bloodline, that by 1449 would have entered explicitly into Iberian political discourse.

In a fascinating footnote, L. P. Harvey, a historian of the Muslims in post-reconquista Spain, claims that

The word “race” . . . first came into existence in Spain, and wherever it is used in the modern world it is in origin a Hispanism. . . . In Spain in the later Middle Ages, where it started out, it certainly carried a negative charge. Raza (raça in medieval spelling) meant a “defect” or “blemish” in the weaving of a piece of cloth. A bolt of cloth, sin raza (“without any defect,” “with no snags”) was naturally worth more, and so by extension the ethnically pure were, for the purposes of the Inquisition, “sin raza de judíos/moros”: “with no Jewish/Moorish blemish on their pedigree.”³⁰

This peculiar metaphor of lineage as textile may have been motivated by the canons of the fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which required both Jews and Saracens to wear distinctive clothing so as to help prevent unwanted interreligious sexual contact. Canon 70 of the same Lateran council further called for all converted former Jews to be prevented from reverting to Judaic rituals, quoting from Deuteronomy 22, “‘a garment that is woven together of woolen and linen’ ought not be put on.”³¹ Such a mixed cloth might indeed be one with a *raça*, a defect or stain, comparable to a defectively mixed lineage. Conversos or others found by the Inquisition to be crypto-Jews continuing their heretical ways were required to submit to a public ritual of penance, the *auto da fé* (act of faith), in which the guilty were dressed in a *sanbenito*, a penitential garment made of yellow sackcloth. The notion of textile as a kind of outer skin that, rather like

the garb of the Obamas in the *New Yorker* cover or the Jew in *Der Ewige Jude*, makes visible the defect or *raça* of the soul within, was thus a central motif of race at the moment of its historical genesis.

Two important mutations have here taken place that signal pastoral power's transformation into an incipiently racial project of proto-governmentality. First, no longer will it be sufficient to define Christendom by way of who belongs to the flock and who does not, since conversion to Christianity now leads to a hierarchizing judgment regarding who might constitute an internal threat to the flock. But in addition, the candidacy of those *con raza* (with race) for status as political enemy takes on the explicitly military aims of the emergent world system, a shift that one only registers by looking both eastward as well as westward. Just thirty-nine years prior to the discovery of the New World, Constantinople had fallen to the Ottomans, so that Christian Spain's defeat of the Moors was paradoxically simultaneous with the rapid westward conquest of the Mediterranean basin by the Ottoman empire. If the conquest of the New World gave birth to the modern world system, as Quijano and Wallerstein argue, then it did so in the context of a Spanish empire that understood itself to be imperiled by a geopolitical Muslim enemy at the very moment of its ascendancy in the Americas. Both Conversos and Moriscos (Muslim converts to Christianity) were feared, not simply because they threatened Christian faith but also because they constituted a potential fifth column for the Turks that might undo the reconquista.

Strangely, without comment on this overriding politico-military context, Netanyahu cites an extraordinary document used by the anti-Converso forces on the eve of the 1492 expulsion that eerily resembles that much later forgery, the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. In this alleged exchange of letters, Spanish Jewry asked the Jewish leaders of Ottoman Constantinople how to respond to their persecution. The latter reply that:

They should train their sons as merchants and financiers so they may strip the Christians of their wealth; they should equip them with the skills of government officials so they may subjugate the Christians and oppress them; they should educate them in the disciplines of the priesthood so that, as priests, they may destroy the Christian temples; and they should teach them the arts of medicine and surgery so they may freely kill Christian patients. . . . Yet they would be able to accomplish all this only if the Christians come to view them as their own—namely, if they convert to Christianity . . . but this conversion should of course be feigned. They should “baptize their bodies” but not their souls, which should continue steadfast in their faithfulness to the Law.³²

Within decades, the same paranoia would attend Moriscos. An extraordinary mutation in the medieval view of the Jew and Muslim as

the politico-theological enemy, early modern Spain's targeting of the Conversos and Moriscos leads in the direction of dogma-line racism. The population of Spain was now subjected to a double political strategy so as to discover the truth of a political danger secreted within the mental life of the corporeally unmarked enemy: 1) the Inquisition's ritual interrogation of the *auto da fé*, which tortures the body in order to yield the confession of the soul, and 2) the policy of *limpieza de sangre* itself, which bypasses the problem of extracting confessions by using bloodlines to identify preemptively the bodies wherein the risk of a dangerous soul must reside.

The Conversos and Moriscos of Iberia were of course not the only *Cristianos Nuevos* of the sixteenth century. So too were the converted indigenous peoples of the Americas and, in short time, the Africans subjected to the slave trade. As María Elena Martínez's pathbreaking book *Genealogical Fictions* demonstrates, the color-line racism that developed alongside the colonial world system drew openly upon the strategy of *limpieza de sangre*. Only Spaniards who had demonstrated their blood purity were permitted to join colonial expeditions to the New World, a rule that evidently sought to ensure that the Creole population of the Americas would be *sin raza* and therefore loyal to the crown. Status distinctions between Spaniards, Indians, and Africans were at first formalized in the early Spanish empire, not with reference to race but rather through the so-called *sistema de las castas*, wherein *castas* referred to ascending categories of prestige that would eventually become distinctions of color (African, Mulatto, Indian, Mestizo, Creole). The word *raça*, by contrast, continued to suggest a specifically *religious* defect or stain, associated with a tendency to heresy carried in the blood. This usage can still be seen in the New World *probanzas* or documents of one's *limpieza de sangre*, which attested to blood purity by typically pronouncing their subjects to be (with slight variations in this language) "Old Christians of clean caste and generation *without any stains or races* from Moors or Jews nor from the newly converted to our holy Catholic faith" (Martinez, 222, emphasis mine).³³ Over time, race came to penetrate and ultimately supplant the discourse of *casta*, but it did so by carrying with it the conception of the potential enemy.

According to Mastnak, the famous 1550–1551 debate between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda put the racial status of America's indigenous peoples on trial by weighing the aptness of the Muslim analogy, the enemy of Christendom against whom a permanent war could be justly declared.³⁴ It is well known that, for Sepúlveda, the Indian was a natural slave in Aristotelian terms, but because of his sinfulness, and because he had failed to respond appropriately to the *Requerimiento*—the declaration of the Spanish king's Christian right to rule the Americas and to bring to its inhabitants the Catholic faith—the Indian was also a new Turk, an infidel against whom one could justly wage war and subsequently

enslave.³⁵ For Las Casas, the native peoples were pagans in need of conversion, but ones who had sufficiently demonstrated their receptiveness to the word of God. One could not justly wage war against them unless they had reneged on their conversion, by somehow rebelling (openly or secretly) against God and Church much as Conversos and Moriscos stood accused of having done.

In the end, we might say that the invention of the color line becomes a compromise solution to the dispute. Color will become an indicator of inferiority, not heresy. In lieu of a unitary body of Christendom, we will now have a basic political distinction drawn between the Christian populations with ancestry from the core, clean-blooded and *sin raza*, as opposed to those new Christians of the periphery, a distinction drawn by blood line, soon to establish the caesura and hierarchy of the color line. But people of color will also become the equivalent of the Turk or even the Jew *in potentia* should they (like the unfaithful Converso or Morisco) reveal by their actions that their conversion and docility as part of the flock has been feigned. By refusing their subjugation, they instantly revert to the status of the enemy in a permanent war. *Raça* thus completes the work of *casta*, providing a dogma line that will shadow the color line as the mechanism for identifying the potentially resisting enemy of the racially stratified body politic.

Secularizing the Politico-Theological Enemy

The origins of race can therefore be traced to the twin births of a color and a dogma line in the very first two centuries of the world system's existence. At that time, as both Walter Mignolo and Nelson Maldonado-Torres have argued, a universalizing Christianity was still the dominant geoculture, if (following Wallerstein) we mean by geoculture something like a dominant political ideology that binds and authorizes the world system's political institutions.³⁶ Latin American philosopher Enrique Dussel has referred to this Iberian moment as the first phase of modernity, a formative stage in the modern world system that can be distinguished from a second modernity tied to the relocation of the hegemonic center from Iberia to the North Atlantic, and also to the supplanting of Christianity by a new geoculture of secular liberalism.³⁷

The transition from a Christian to a secular geoculture can be most concretely explored by considering the difference between the respective political projects to which they were articulated. The first modernity of Spanish hegemony organized itself politically around the mission to universalize a holy Christian empire, so that the conquest of the Americas and even the wars against Protestantism operated on the model of a permanent

just war against infidelity that would realize the eschatological promise of global salvation, final political unity, and a Kingdom of Heaven.

With the defeat of Spanish ambitions and, more generally, with the emergence of a Catholic-Protestant deadlock, this holy imperial vision gave way to the project associated with what is usually known as the Westphalian interstate system. Secularism can, of course, be understood in many ways, but from the viewpoint of this Westphalian order, I would like to consider it, at least momentarily, as a mode of political rationality that abetted the ascendancy of the state-form. This political rationality essentially sought to calculate answers to two basic questions of government. First, it addressed the external problem of how best to build, in place of a holy empire, what Foucault calls the “fragile eschatology” of a peaceful balance of power between competing states in the system. This goal would necessarily also include drawing and defending the system’s expanding frontiers.³⁸ Concomitantly, secular political rationality also addressed the internal problem of how each state might govern well, a project captured in the very word “statistics,” which initially meant a “knowledge of the state” and which necessarily included calculating and managing differential civic loyalty of populations.³⁹ The first of these problems reconnects secular political rationality to anti-Islamism, while the second establishes its relationship to modern anti-Semitism.

Church and State: From Pastorate to Governmentality

The dominant secularist narrative about the separation of church and state is strikingly beneficent and normative. We are told that this transition was achieved during the seventeenth century, in response to Europe’s entanglement in what are sometimes called the *wars of religion* (including the French Wars of Religion and culminating in the Thirty Years’ War) that followed the Protestant Reformation. To this day, liberal philosophers such as John Rawls and Jeffrey Stout use these wars as a kind of origin story for the birth of second modernity’s secular political liberalism.⁴⁰ In their account, the wars of religion represented eruptions of intolerance wherein princes aligned themselves with or against the Catholic Church, spilling much blood over the question of which religion the population would adopt. The story ends affirmatively, with a universal recognition of the ethical and political imperative to stop killing in the name of faith. The various sovereign heads of state agreed at last to “tolerate” the official religion of their neighbors. Gradually, religious minorities within the state received the right to worship differently in private. The United States took this doctrine of tolerance even further, formally separating church and state. Disallowing any official religion, the state agreed to tolerate a

plurality of religions, so long as they threatened neither its authority nor the unity of the people.

There are several problems worth noting about this narrative. First, in appearing to explain the origins and reason of “religious tolerance,” it actually lends legitimacy to the interstate system that emerged out of this exact historical juncture. As historians and international affairs scholars alike tell us, the Treaties of Westphalia that ended the so-called wars of religion also gave rise to the absolute and mutually autonomous sovereignty of the states that were party to the negotiation. Whereas before church authority crosscut the authority of princes, now each state would win full authority over the temporal matters of the people within its territory while respecting the equally full authority of its peer states within their territory. Secular state authority thus finds its legitimation in the name of maintaining principles of political civility and religious tolerance.

This historical account, which so clearly serves as a legitimation narrative for the modern state, obscures a far more complex and interesting analysis of the genesis of second political modernity. In his fascinating essay “A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House,” William Cavanaugh has questioned what this waving of the bloody shirt of intolerant religiosity actually serves to obscure. As Cavanaugh notes, the state had been in the ascendancy well before the wars of religion even began. The princes who fought these wars, moreover, were far more interested in their own political power vis-à-vis opposing princes than in advancing any religious cause. In the end, suggests Cavanaugh, these wars led not to the defeat of religious intolerance but rather to the final triumph of the ascendant state over the juridically and politically declining authority of church. It is not the separation of church and state so much as the church’s historic *defeat* by the state that birthed the modern political doctrine of sovereignty, which enshrined the power of law in the state. But the defeat of the Church also birthed modern governmentality insofar as it was propelled by the invention of the secular political principle of “ratio status” or “raison d’état,” the secular political principle that Bogislaus Philipp von Chemnitz defined in 1640 as the striving in all political matters “solely for the preservation, expansion, and felicity of the state, and for which we must employ the most ready and swift means.”⁴¹

While international affairs scholars have written extensively about how the conclusion of the religious wars in the Treaties of Westphalia established what we now term the “Westphalian” system of states, they have said far less about what the aftermath of those treaties signified for the side of the Church. The consequences were in fact enormous, determining as they did what religion would come to mean in an age of secular political power. Daniel Philpott points out that the present meaning of the word “religion” only took shape with the rise of the Westphalian system.⁴²

As the church fought unsuccessfully against the Westphalian system of *raison d'état*, which was the position of secular thinkers known as the *politiques*, it polemicized against as yet another form of dogmatic heresy akin to the pastoral threat posed by Jews and Muslims.⁴³ But eventually, as the Church was forced to withdraw from direct exercise of political authority, and as one's church affiliation became a different and distinct matter from one's status as the political subject of a state, "religion" for the first time came to be understood as a nonpolitical, distinct form of personal belief, a dogma affiliation known as religion. Cavanaugh goes so far as to claim that the wars of religion in fact *created religion*, insofar as we now conceive it as "a set of beliefs which is defined as personal conviction and which can exist separately from one's public loyalty to the State. The creation of religion and thus the privatization of the Church, is correlative to the rise of the State."⁴⁴

Talal Asad offers a parallel observation when he suggests that our prevailing notion of religion as a system of "belief" or "faith" somehow distinct from political and social life is a perspective inextricably tied to the rise in Europe of a concept of the "secular."⁴⁵

We might in fact say that *the Church* or *Christendom* was transubstantiated by secularism into *Christian religion* or *Christianity*, to be understood no longer as a political rationality in its own right but rather as a belief system that "should be regarded by the political authorities with indifference as long as it remains within the private domain."⁴⁶ In a very similar vein, Robert Baird has argued (by way of an analysis of David Hume's *The Natural History of Religion*) that to understand secularism we must "think our way through the modern vortex in which religion separated itself from Christendom and then in turn created Christianity and world religions as instances of itself."⁴⁷

The observation that religion is a post-Christendom secularist concept leads in two seemingly contrary directions. On the one hand, it suggests that religion is itself an auxiliary ideogeme of secularism. But it also indicates that the secularism of modern Europe represents a particular translation or mutation of the discourses of the Christian Church. This is confirmed in Schmitt's well-known insight into the "political theology" of the allegedly secular state, which institutionalizes an ideal of sovereignty that is nothing other than a recasting of the Christian theological concept of God's will.⁴⁸ The origins of this translation are classically spelled out by Ernst Kantorowicz, whose *The King's Two Bodies* amply documents how the monarch's status as sovereign directly modeled itself upon Christ's status as simultaneously human and divine, with both a material and a transcendent body whose mystical unity constituted the locus of his authority.⁴⁹ Modern religion (conceived as privatized belief) is therefore by no means the only way that the Church has lived on in (and continues to haunt) the

secular age. One also finds a legacy of the Church in the Christological basis to the principle of sovereignty. We live in an age of what Eric Santner has called the “royal remains,” wherein popular sovereignty constitutes a system of the “people’s two bodies” that translates into secular national terms the sacred doubleness of the king.⁵⁰

When it comes to the genealogy of dogma-line racism, however, our attention must turn, not to Schmitt’s analysis of sovereignty but to the different, and hitherto unexamined, political theology of postpastoral power that we might extrapolate from Foucault’s lectures on governmentality. Given that governmentality translated the politics of Church rather than Crown, it required of the secular turn a supplemental series: not only sovereignty’s readaptation of Christ to King to People but also a movement from Christ(endom) to Flock to Population. As we shall see, both the integrative question of how to consolidate *Europe* as the core of an interstate system and the internalist question of how to regulate a state’s population presented themselves as politico-theological problems.

Europe at the Threshold of Secular Global Governmentality

In a short but provocative essay, Mastnak fills the gap between his book on the Crusades and the present day by discussing the procedure through which medieval Christendom was ultimately supplanted by the modern entity known as Europe. Though secular in conception, and territorial in logic, the new unity called Europe was nonetheless built in part by borrowing from the model of the Crusades, deriving its vision of continental unity, as he shows, through stressing the symbolic importance of “chasing the Turk out of Europe.”⁵¹

While Mastnak does not read this history in the terms of world-system theory, the birth of Europe could be interpreted as the provision of a politico-theological dimension to the formation of the interstate system itself. It elaborates a geopolitical system in which capitalism spread through the political mechanism of a system of “sovereign” states in the core region deemed fit to rule over the periphery: the colonial nomos of the earth that Schmitt appropriately termed the “*Jus Publicum Europaeum*.”⁵² Yet Europe is not simply a legal order. As Foucault notes, it also had a part to play in the transition from pastoral power to governmentality, wherein (as I noted earlier) the grand vision of a universal Christian empire was relinquished in favor of a balance of power between European states that required a new “diplomatic-military system” to serve as the first major technological ensemble of the emerging art of government.⁵³ Why and for what was a balance of power important? Foucault himself stresses that it served the process of producing the new idea of European unity out of a competition of states and the play of forces. At one level, then, we may

say that it seized upon politico-military competition in order to maintain peace (a truce) within Europe. But if the goal is at least *symbolically* to deal with the interstate system's "just wars" outside of Europe, then we can say that the diplomatic-military system also functioned as a geopolitical coalition, the hegemonic unity of a *Jus Publicum Europaeum* that collectively dominated the expanding colonial periphery of the world system while also policing its borders against forces in that part of the globe that still lay outside of it.

The Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world that it represented, of course, immediately adjacent to the emergent space of Europe, so that the expansion of the interstate system (on its way to becoming a genuinely global world system) was pitted symbolically upon exactly that part of the world that geographically represented its limit or border. That border, however, can itself be understood as the deployment of a dogma line. In certain respects, the interstate system's stated goal of driving the Turk out of Europe offered a secular update of Christendom's earlier war against its Muslim enemy. It sought to achieve a statist equivalent of the medieval "peace of God," a European unity or balance of power within the ex-pastorate. Its secularism, however, was substantive as a mode of political theology. For Christendom, the Muslim had been the ultimate infidel, the agent of the Antichrist. For the secular state system of Europe, the form of infidelity became a disloyalty to the state itself as a political form distinct from the Church. What the Muslim region of the Ottoman Empire represented as Europe's immediate outside was an unwillingness to maintain religion as a privatized domain posing no threat to civic loyalty to the State.

One sees this motif at work as early as John Locke's famous "Letter Concerning Toleration," when he argues that the state should permit multiple churches and tolerate religious diversity, but only up to the limit (the dogma line) of those religions that themselves do not claim political authority or disrupt the balance of power by throwing support behind competing states. Any such church deserves

no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince. For by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country and suffer his own people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers against his own Government.⁵⁴

The religious enemy-in-waiting that Locke actually has in mind here is the Roman Catholic Church, which had presumably shown its political ambitions by reserving the right to excommunicate the British monarch

Henry VIII. Locke builds his argument, however, by citing Islam as the paradigmatic instance of the confounding of Church and State, religions and political authority, private belief and public loyalty:

It is ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in his religion, but in everything else a faithful subject to a Christian magistrate, whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the Mufti of Constantinople, who himself is entirely obedient to the Ottoman Emperor and frames the feigned oracles of that religion according to his pleasure. But this Mahometan living amongst Christians would yet more apparently renounce their government if he acknowledged the same person to be head of his Church who is the supreme magistrate in the state.⁵⁵

It is in this era, as Europe coalesced into a system of states whose authority rested in the secularism of government, that the orientalist figure of the *Turkish despot* became a unifying political motif. The spread of the interstate system, from Locke's moment right through the end of World War I, was modeled upon the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, which itself served as the paradigmatically un-European power, inimical to the casting out of religion from an interstate system based on sovereign political authority.⁵⁶

In this sense, the interstate system was itself predicated upon what, to rephrase Balibar, we might call a *generalized anti-Islamism*, in which any regime that was not directly modeled upon, and incorporated into, the secular interstate system expanding out of Europe functioned as a version of the unsecular and therefore intolerant Turkish despot. Here we have the prototype for the later notion of the totalitarian and the rogue state, which whether communist (the Soviet Union), third worldist (Chavez's Venezuela), or Islamist (Iran), embraces a dogma viewed as a politico-theological (a heretical) threat to the interstate system itself.

Jews, Dogma Lines, and Populations

Locke's reference, not just to the Ottoman Empire without but also to the "Mahometan" within the state who lives among Christians, leads directly to what might be called the Westphalian political theology of population. With the rise of the secular state, the Church's management of the Christian flock became downgraded to a "merely" religious problem. Yet the management of the flock became a model for regulating the population internal to a state. A useful analogy can be drawn between this secularization of pastoral power and the secularization of sovereignty, whereby Christ's simultaneously divine and human nature was translated into the doctrine of the king's two bodies and, later, what Santner terms the "people's two bodies."⁵⁷ The pastorate's transformation into govern-

mentality might be understood as follows: the focus of translation here is arguably on the soul rather than the body.

Like the monarchic sovereign as studied by Kantorowicz, the pastorate was also a doubled political phenomenon. It was, on the one hand, a flock of errant souls in search of salvation and thus what Foucault calls an “individualizing” form of power. But the flock also constituted *Christendom* as a collectivity, a unity of the faithful that in some sense represented the spirit of Christ. The secular translation therefore might be conceived as the production of a parallel doubling: the population as a multitude of individuals, each of whom combines a different set of variables, but which joins with the other individuals into an aggregate about which certain predictable calculations can be made: about rates of birth, death, education, health, and productivity but also about its opinions, preferences, and beliefs, hence also about its interior life.

At the moment of the secular state, the disposition of this interior life of the population would become a central problem for managing the polity, a problem for study in the original sense of statistics (knowledge of the forces of the state). This adaption of the pastoral can be said to have operated in at least two ways. Increasingly, governmentality involves conducting the normative *secular* dispositions within the population. In place of a pastoral government of souls concerned with managing sin and faith for the ultimate aim of salvation, we have a political government of men focused upon work habits, social attitudes, sexual mores, and, to follow David Lloyd and Paul Thomas, perhaps even culture per se.⁵⁸ But religion, now understood in its privatized sense of personal belief, is itself *folded into* the problems of governmentality because some religions produce healthy civic loyalty while others imperil it. The religious standing of one’s soul, we might say, becomes translated into the political implications of one’s states of mind: one’s opinions, beliefs, loyalties, desires.

In this move from soul to mind, interiority itself becomes secularized on a politico-theological basis. Enlightenment political philosophers like Rousseau, for example, will take up the new question of “civil religion,” evaluating which forms of religion are conducive to public unity and which threaten divisiveness.⁵⁹ Here the issue of war and violence arises as an answer to a secular modern “problem,” a Jewish or Muslim problem, for example. Governmental rationality will divide religion on either side of a dogma line, separating those who lend themselves to patriotism and civil tranquility from those who (again because they encroach on the claims of the State and thereby risk reviving the Church) ought, in Rousseau’s words, “to be driven from the State.”⁶⁰

There is, within this secular political rationality, a tacit racial issue. Both “race” and “reason” trace back etymologically to the Latin *ratio*. This common root actually matters in the new secular political context of *ratio*

status or *reason of state*, which concerned itself with the knowledge how to classify people in ways that might preserve and expand the forces of the state. At the same time, the older Spanish sense of *raça* as stain or defect infiltrated secular governmental rationality insofar as the particular populations targeted by state racisms would be those who carried a perceived risk (an endemic defect) to the forces of the state.

In his general oeuvre, Foucault elucidated various figures who would be targeted as the biopolitical threat to the goals of government: the mad in relation to rational behavior, the criminal in relation to lawful behavior, the pervert in relation to sexual behavior. All of these are, in some sense, racialized targets of the new techniques of governmental power and a matter of paramount importance for *raison d'état*. As a peculiar case among these biopolitical sites, religion gradually came to model the calculation of ideological dispositions, the *interior* raciality of populations. In this context, Jews and Muslims served as the paradigmatic abnormal of uncivil religious beliefs, figures whose ideological dispositions compromised their reliability as citizen-subjects. In a secular political universe, moreover, Jews and Muslims became prototypes for the abnormality of analogized secular religiosities that, over time, came to include dogmas ranging from socialism or anarchism to black power or feminism. In short, the production of the Jew and the Muslim as enemies would survive medieval Christendom and Iberian first modernity to birth a flexible racial strategy integral to the political order of secular Westphalian modernity.

What exactly constituted the Jew's uncivil threat? In eighteenth and nineteenth century anti-Semitism, the Jews constituted an intolerable threat to the state, just as they had once been so for the Church. But the issue now became not their unwillingness to embrace Christ so much as their inability to profess a religion neutered of secular political significance since Judaism possessed a religiously based juridical and political system of its own (Talmudic law, Rabbinic authority). Summing up a rich scholarly record, Wendy Brown contends that Jews became a problem for modern liberal tolerance because they represented an alien presence within the territorial borders of the state, internal to the population, we might say, yet not of the nation.⁶¹ But I would suggest that this doubt concerning their loyalty to the state was further compounded by the fact that Judaism was not a religion in the post-Westphalian sense—a set of civil theological beliefs and private institutions—but in fact constituted something like a pre-Westphalian church with its own political jurisdiction. In this respect, the Jews represented an intolerable throwback to the era before the separation of church and state and a more fundamental threat to the state than mere nonnationals.

In some not-always-avowed fashion, the Christian origins of gov-

ernmentality also exacerbated this distrust of the Jews: they, after all, were precisely those who had for centuries refused to become part of the pastoral flock. Would they ever willingly become part of the *secular* population? One can see here why even secular Jews continued to threaten, for socialism, communism, or even global financial interests could readily substitute for religious disloyalty. If anything, the secular Jew becomes the analog of the Iberian converso or crypto-Jew, one whose conversion can never quite be trusted.

How did governmental secularism reshape the twinned strategies of color and dogma? It is certain that the racial strategies typically worked in tandem. By the mid-nineteenth century, for instance, modern anti-Semitism would also become racialized in the sense of the color line. This process coincided, not surprisingly, with the rapid expansion of Europe's colonial holdings and with a new phase of colonial racism that now included the United States. No longer simply a population apart, or even just a bloodline, Jewishness became biologized, and in the process unassimilable to a narrowing and sharpening conception of whiteness. It is at this point that the American tradition of ethnic studies, in the work of scholars like Karen Brodtkin and Matthew Frye Jacobson, has rightly incorporated the study of Jews as racial subjects, one of many immigrant European ethnicities who entered the United States as nonwhite races and remained so well into the twentieth century, perhaps as late as the 1940s.⁶²

Color-line racialization made the Jewish question more intractable, to be sure. As Wendy Brown sees it, the racialized Jewish body prevented it from ever fully inhabiting the space of the abstract universal citizen. But I would stress that this color-line racialization overlay and exacerbated a dogma-line racism that represented a secular version of the pastorate's theological enemy. That is, while it is surely correct to observe that Jews were not considered white, their "race" remained fundamentally associated with an ideological disposition, with a set of beliefs that delivered their loyalty to a different political authority (rabbis and elders, if not simply the Jewish people). In anti-Semitic discourse, the Jew's desire for citizenship and civil participation masked an intention to colonize the states they inhabited with the purpose of amassing their own wealth and bodies.

Meanwhile, it is equally important to see that the dogma line continuously supplemented hierarchies of race and class alike by serving to identify enemy populations among peoples of color. Because it is routed through the secularized problems of the pastorate and possesses at its heart a religious kernel, dogma-line racism has tended to trigger a distinctive ensemble of racial connotations. Whereas the threat associated with the color line is primarily understood corporeally (i.e., through their very bodies, they are threatening our whiteness, our sex, our biological superiority), the dogma-

line threat takes the form of a covert war by an ideologically motivated enemy: due to how they think and what they believe, they actively seek to infiltrate and destroy us.

The migration of dogma-line racism to colonial spaces has been amply documented by Aamir Mufti, whose *Enlightenment in the Colony* traces how the “Jewish Question” was exported to colonial South Asia as a mean of managing the Muslim minority, a population targeted as potentially disloyal to British colonial rule, and later to the national state of India.⁶³ Not only South Asian Muslims but blacks and indigenous peoples, the central targets of the color line, have also been historically subjected to this kind of racism. Every time distinctions are drawn between the good subject of proper minority conduct (from Booker T. Washington to the model Asian minority) and the bad subject who either expresses a different loyalty (Paul Robeson) or, worse yet, conceals it (Nat Turner), dogma-line racism swings into operation. It animates a flexible racialization of the abolitionist, the treacherous Indian, the black-power militant, the communist, and now the erstwhile terrorist, all of whom find definition through the distinction between civil and uncivil religiosity (personal belief, conviction) that separates the normalized subject (today our good Arab and Muslim neighbors) from a segment of the population that threatens (the terrorist who blasphemers).

If dogma-line racism is indeed a kind of generalized anti-Semitism (abstracting from the figure of both Muslim and Jew), then it captures in the political field something very much akin to what Richard Hofstadter once termed the “paranoid style of American politics.”⁶⁴ The dogma line discovers the conspiratorial threat within the population, whether communist, Papist, or Islamist, a kind of religious zeal that breeds political disloyalty and social danger. Such racisms provide a crucial supplement to those of the color line, which tend to cast racial difference as the distribution of human beings along an axis of superiority and inferiority, humanity and animality. Dogma-line racisms would seem to operate across an axis of the faithful and heretical, or to paraphrase George W. Bush, an “axis of evil.” They tend to cast their secularized theological enemies as clever and crafty, capable of outmaneuvering, exploiting, and secretly undermining civilization. All dogma-line racisms are exercised against a population that figures a threatening *countergovernmentality*, a dogma that seeks the formation of an alternative flock potentially at war with that of the secular state and the civil society it defends.

Coda: The Dogma Line of Contemporary Islamophobia

Like the Moriscos or Conversos of early modern Spain, the secular Jewish citizens of nineteenth-century Europe, or American blacks in the civil

rights era, it is assumed that most Muslims may mean well and peacefully accept contemporary global civil society. And yet, it is also taken for granted that it is among this population that we will find the “network of terrorists,” miniature churches of dogmatic threat against which permanent interrogation must be maintained and permanent war must be waged. In the self-professedly racially tolerant world of multicultural global civil society, a world that fancies itself to have transcended the color line, the terrorist embodies the racialized abstraction of intolerance itself, the subject who lies on the far side of the dogma line. Understanding contemporary Islamophobia as a rearticulated racism of inferiority clarifies our return today to indefinite detentions and interrogations, forced confession, the identification of conspiracies, and, most generally, to the governmental targeting of a potentially unmarked enemy race that must yield to us its heretical intentions and confess the truth of its dogmatically driven abnormality. In the name of global civil security, neither the United States nor the version of the globe it defends can afford for a single minute to tolerate the truly intolerant.

Notes

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1. Bayoumi develops this point through his discussion of the post-9/11 national security policy of “special registration” (now at least theoretically suspended). The only possible purpose of this policy, he suggests, was to inscribe into law the cultural assumption that the all alien, foreign-born Muslim men are potential terrorists whose innocence must be specially vindicated. See Moustafa Bayoumi, “Racing Religion,” *New Centennial Review* 6, no. 2 (2006): 267–93.

2. Nadine Naber, “Introduction: Arab Americans and US Racial Formations,” in *Race and Arab Americans before and after 9/11: From Invisible Citizens to Visible Subjects*, ed. Amaney Jamal and Nadine Naber (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 1–45. Naber observes that before 9/11 most critics approached Arab racialization by exploring whether the United States counted people as white (which from a strictly legal perspective they often were), nonwhite (as they often appeared in popular discourse), or somewhere in between, perhaps as what Naber calls the “white sheep” among people of color. See also Louise Calkins, “Thinking outside the Box: Arabs and Race in the United States,” in *Race and Arab Americans before and after 9/11*, 46–80.

3. W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto,” in *The Social Theory of W. E. B. Du Bois*, ed. Phil Zuckerman (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2004), 45–46.

4. I here mean Étienne Balibar’s contributions to Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (New York: Verso, 1991); Mah-

mood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Three River, 2005); George Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Gil Anidjar, *The Jew, the Arab, a History of the Enemy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), as well as Anidjar, *Semites: Race, Religion, Literature* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); David Theo Goldberg, *The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neo-Liberalism* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008); and Bob Meister's discussion of the "dialectic of race and place" in *After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). In different ways, each attempts to develop fluid accounts of the history of race that posit interactions between Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and color-line racism or, more generally, the intimate historical relationship of religion and race.

5. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–79*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009).

6. Étienne Balibar, "Racism as Universalism," in *Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy before and after Marx* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 191–204; Carl Schmitt's *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). Schmitt stresses that the political does not refer to the state, but rather that the concept of the state presupposes the political in the form of making friend-enemy distinctions (22–26). Thus, if a church (or a religion) generates a friend-enemy distinction, it becomes political even in the absence of the state-form. Schmitt's observation would lead to the conclusion that the logic of war can take nonstatist forms, as does pastoral power or governmentality more generally, for example, in the view of this essay.

7. Inderpal Grewal, *Transnational America: Feminisms, Diasporas, Neoliberalisms* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 209.

8. Leti Volpp, "The Citizen and the Terrorist," *UCLA Law Review* 49 (2002): 1575–99; esp. 1584.

9. For this very reason (the ease of assimilation to the ethnic studies model), there are already the beginnings of a study of "Arab-American literature," the uncovering of a new literary canon, and so forth. See, for example, Wail S. Hassan's "The Rise of Arab-American Literature: Orientalism and Cultural Translation in the Work of Armeen Rihani," *American Literary History* 20, nos. 1–2 (April 2008): 245–75.

10. See "Arab American," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_American (accessed 22 September 2011), which cites data from the Arab American Institute indicating that 63 percent of American Arabs identify as Christian and only 24 percent as Muslim, due to the preponderance of Christian Lebanese immigration to the United States in earlier decades. The remaining demographic claims are based upon the Wikipedia article "Islam in the United States," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_the_United_States (accessed 2 February 2012), which itself relies heavily on Pew Center research. Population estimates concerning the size and composition of the Muslim population of the United States are exceedingly contentious and highly politicized, so statistical claims should be treated with care.

11. Thanks to Nikhil Singh's helpful reader's report for this pithy formulation.

12. This reflects the classic formulation for fetishistic disavowal offered by Žižek in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (New York: Verso, 1989), 28–30.

13. *Der Ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew)*, dir. Fritz Hippler, 1940.

14. Étienne Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism?,'" in Balibar and Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class*, 17–28; see pages 23–24.

15. Ivan Davidson Kalmar, "Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: The Formation of a Secret," *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 7, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 135–43. See also Anidjar, *Semites*.

16. Thanks to Judith Butler for calling my attention to this distinction: the racism of "interiority" that this essay explores is not tantamount to a "racism without race."

17. Fanon's "Algeria Unveiled" demonstrates this logic perfectly. The veil becomes an indicator of a potential resister, but the absence of the veil, the apparently "modern" or "secular" Algerian woman may represent an even deeper form of deception for the revolutionary woman. See Frantz Fanon, "Algeria Unveiled," in *The New Left Reader*, ed. Carl Oglesby (New York: Grove, 1969): 161–85.

18. Cyrus Voris and Ethan Reiff, "Al Faitha," *Sleeper Cell*, season 1, episode 1, dir. Clark Johnson, aired 4 December 2005; *24*, season 2 (Burbank, CA: 20th Century Fox Television, 2002–2003).

19. Voris and Reiff, "Al Faitha"; season 2 of *24* bears a similar racial dynamic in the narrative thread about Marie Warner, the rich white woman who ends up being revealed as the real Muslim terrorist threat rather than her Arab husband. See *24*, season 2, episode 12, dir. Frederick King Keller, aired 11 February 2003.

20. For more details about Padilla's case, see "In Padilla Wiretaps, Murky View of 'Jihad' Case," *New York Times*, 4 January 2007.

21. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 115–90.

22. Tomaz Mastnak, *Crusading Peace: Christendom, the Muslim World, and Western Political Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

23. Anidjar, *The Jew, the Arab*. While this essay shares themes with Anidjar's investigation, my approach differs in crucial ways. I will be sketching a genealogy rather than an ontology of the enemy (one that stresses the strategic redeployments of war rather than taking war to represent a permanent theme). This essay also substitutes the "Muslim" for the "Arab" in order to track more precisely the history of a racism of interiority. Finally, I ground my reading of the theological enemy in the governmental (rather than sovereign) strand of political practice, one that Foucault himself did not associate with a military theme, perhaps because he wished to explore liberalism as a mode of producing docility through freedom. In my estimation, however, liberalism must still always produce for itself an ideological limit to freedom, what I am essentially calling the dogma line. This limit would run parallel to the bodily limit to freedom associated with liberalism's color-line practices of slavery and colonization.

24. See Allan Cutler and Helen Cutler, *The Jew as Ally of the Muslim: Medieval Roots of Anti-Semitism* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 96.

25. Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76* (New York: Penguin, 2004). My principal work with this lecture series appears in another essay, "Global Society Must Be Defended: Biopolitics without Boundaries," in "The Ends of War," special issue, *Social Text* 25 (2007): 53–79.

26. Anibal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Americanness as Concept: Or the Americas in the Modern World-System," *International Social Science Journal* 131 (1992): 549–57.

27. Anibal Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America," *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no. 3 (2000): 533.

28. Quijano, "Coloniality of Power," 575.

29. Ben Zion Netanyahu, *The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth-Century Spain*, 2nd. ed. (New York: New York Review of Books, 2001).

30. L. P. Harvey, *Muslims in Spain 1500–1614* (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 2006), 7, n4. In this passage, Harvey elaborates on the entry in Corominas's *Diccionario Crítico Etimológico de La Lengua Castellana, Volumen III, L-RE* (Berne, Switzerland: Editorial Francke, 1954), 1019. The entry indicates that the word *raza*, drawn from the Latin *ratio* (in the sense of modality, species, or category), “*vino a confundirse con el viejo y castizo raça ‘realeza o defecto en el paño,’ ‘defecto, culpa,’ de otra etimología,*” came to be confused with the old and originary “*raça,*” meaning a thinness or defect in a cloth (translation mine).

31. Internet History Sourcebook Project, www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/lateran4.html (accessed 14 September 2011).

32. Ben Zion Netanyahu, *The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth-Century Spain* (New York: Random House, 1995), 1065. See Henry Hart Milman's *The History of the Jews* (London: Everyman, 1829), 320, n21, for a slightly different translation. The original document appears to be quoted from the work of the great Spanish literary critic José Amador de Los Ríos.

33. María Elena Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions: Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). Martínez offers many such examples in this wonderfully researched book, inadvertently showing how even the medieval spelling *raça* continued to be used, essentially in its original sense as a blemish or defect. Read in this way, her book offers a preponderance of evidence that what she is really documenting is the birth of race itself along a double axis. She sidesteps making this claim because, in her view, to do so might risk once again blaming Iberians for the scourge of world racism in the tradition of the “black legend” that Protestant nations developed to lambast the Spanish for their cruelty, and which later even blamed them for the historical underdevelopment of Latin America relative to North America (9–10). But this seems like a needless worry. The Iberian notion of *raza*, which would ultimately wed dogma and color together, was adopted throughout the colonial world system. To say that it took its original form through certain particularities of the Spanish context in no way obliges one to deny the way in which race as a practice of power quickly became a generalized strategy of power across all the European empires.

34. See Tomaz Mastnak, “Fictions in Political Thought: Las Casas, Sepúlveda, the Indians, and the Turks,” *Filosfski Vestnik* 15, no. 2 (1994): 127–49.

35. The Requerimiento was the official declaration written in 1510 that was supposed to always be read aloud to native communities before an act of aggression, so that they could be said to have officially received word of Christ, the authority of the Papacy, and the right of Spain's monarch to rule the New World. Any resistance to that rule and to being missionized therefore constituted a legal cause for a just war. The Requerimiento is translated in full in Lewis Hanke's “The ‘Requerimiento’ and Its Interpreters,” *Revista de Historia de América* 1 (March 1938): 25–34. See also Luna Nájera, “Myth and Prophecy in Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda's Crusading ‘Exhortación,’” *Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies* 35, no. 1 (2011): article 4, <http://digitalcommons.asphs.net/bsphs/vol35/iss1/4>. Nájera notes that Sepúlveda, a major champion of holy war against the Ottoman empire prior to his involvement in the Native American question, brought those former arguments directly to bear on the latter.

36. Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “Secularism and Religion in the Modern Colonial World-System: From Secular Postcoloniality to Postsecular Transmodernity,” in *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*, ed. Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 360–84.

37. Enrique Dussel, "Beyond Eurocentrism: The World-System and the Limits of Modernity," in *The Cultures of Globalization*, ed. Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 3–31.
38. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 300.
39. *Ibid.*, 274–75.
40. John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 223–51, and Jeffrey Stout, *The Flight from Authority: Religion, Morality, and the Quest for Autonomy* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). See William Cavanaugh's brilliant analysis of their liberal narrative in "A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House: The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State," *Modern Theology* 11, no. 4 (1995): 397–420.
41. Bogislaus Philipp von Chemnitz, *Interets des Princes d'Allemagne*, vol. 1 (Freistade, 1712 [1640]), 12; quoted and translated in Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 251, n24, 257.
42. Daniel Philpott, "The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations," *World Politics* 55 (October 2002): 66–95.
43. Foucault mentions, but does not comment on, such a Catholic antisecular polemic written by Raymond de Saint Maitin as late as 1667 that was aptly titled *The True Religion in Its True Light against All the Contrary Errors of the Atheists, Libertines, Mathematicians or Others Who Establish Destiny and Fatality, the Pagans, Jews, Mohammedans, Heretical Sects in General, Schismatics, Machiavellians and Politiques* (*Security*, 242).
44. Cavanaugh, "A Fire Strong Enough," 403.
45. Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
46. *Ibid.*, 205.
47. Robert J. Baird, "Late Secularism," in *Secularisms*, ed. Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 162–177; esp. 167.
48. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
49. Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
50. Eric Santner, *The Royal Remains: The People's Two Bodies and the Endgames of Sovereignty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
51. Tomaz Mastnak, "Europe and the Muslims: The Permanent Crusade?," in *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, ed. Ermran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 205–48; esp. 207–8.
52. Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. G. L. Ulman (New York: Telos, 2006).
53. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 285–310.
54. John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (London: J. Cawdor, 1800), 102.
55. *Ibid.*, 103.
56. For a detailed discussion of this trope, see Alan Grosrichard's classic, *The Sultan's Court: European Fantasies of the East*, trans. Liz Harron (New York: Verso Press, 1998).
57. Santner, *The Royal Remains*, xv.
58. David Lloyd and Paul Thomas, *Culture and the State* (New York: Routledge, 1996).
59. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: Dover, 2003).
60. *Ibid.*, 97.

61. Wendy Brown, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
62. Karen Brodtkin, *How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says about Race in America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998); Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
63. Aamir Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
64. Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (New York: Vintage, 2008).